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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
David Joseph Meister appeals from the summary dismissal of the claims alleged in his
,_

petition for post-conviction relief. He asserts that the district court erred by failing to recognize
material facts that if proven true would entitle Mr. Meister to relief.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
On December 11,2001, Tonya Hart was shot twice while at home in Moscow, Idaho, which
she shared with her boyfriend, Jesse Linderman. State v. Meister, 148 Idaho 236, 238 (2009). In
August 2002, the police interrogated Mr. Meister in connection with Ms. Hart's death and Meister
stated that he shot Ms. Hart in exchange for a $1000 payment from Jesse Linderman. Id. Mr.
Meister was charged with first-degree murder and conspiracy to commit first-degree murder. Id.
Mr. Meister's conviction on both counts was later vacated on appeal before the Idaho Supreme
Court, which found the district Cl,urt had committed reversible error when preventing Mr. Meister
from presenting evidence that an alternative perpetrator likely committed the murder. Id. at 243.
Mr. Meister was subsequently tried and convicted, and sentenced to fixed life imprisonment. Mr.
Meister appealed: Appellate counsel argued that the district court's limitation that expert Dr.
Richard Ofshe could not testify to specific instances of coercive police tactics denied Mr. Meister
his right to present the defense that his confession was false and the product of unduly suggestive
and coercive police interrogation. This Court denied the appeal, holding that the issues, if error,
was nonetheless harmless. State v. Meister, No. 39807, 2014 WL861717, at *7-10 (Idaho Ct.App.
Mar.4, 2014) (unpublished).

,..
Mr. Meister subsequently filed an application for post-conviction relief, along with
fa

supporting affidavit and exhibits (R.Vol.1-2, pp. 14-325), and then he amended (R.Vol.16,
pp.3511-28; R.Vol.18, pp.3862-4324). The State answered and contemporaneously moved for
summary disposition of all Mr. Meister's claims (R.Vol.17, pp.3540-90.) The district court granted

i-.

the motion, summarily dismissing every post-conviction claim, and denying Mr. Meister's motion
for discovery (R.Vol.21, pp.4457-4475) and motion for judicial notice (R.Vol.22, pp.4645-47).

!=-=I

Mr. Meister appeals. (R.Vol.22, pp.4650-55.)
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

A. Did the district court err by summarily dismissing Mr. Meister's post-conviction claims of
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel?
B. Did the district court err by summarily dismissing Mr. Meister's post-conviction claims of
ineffective assistance of trial counsel regarding:
1. Trial counsels' failure to present evidence that Mr. Meister's confession was false?
2. Trial counsels' failure to present evidence of Mr. Meister's alibi?
3. Trial counsels' failure to present evidence of an alternative perpetrator?
4. Trial counsel's failure to object to prosecutorial misconduct?
C. Did the district court err by summarily dismissing Mr. Meister's post-conviction claim of
ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Thomas Whitney, for introducing prejudicial
evidence?
D. Did the district court err by summarily dismissing Mr. Meister's post-conviction claim that
the district court had erred by limiting Dr. Ofshe's testimony?
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E. Did the district court err by summarily dismissing Mr. Meister's post-conviction claim that
the jury room was not sufficiently insulated from sound generated in the courtroom?
F. Did the district court err by summarily dismissing Mr. Meister's post-conviction claim of
cumulative error at trial?
G. Did the district court err by denying Mr. Meister's motion for discovery?
ARGUMENT

A. The District Court Erred by Summarily Dismissing Mr. Meister's Post-Conviction Claim
of Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel
I. Standard of Review
Where a criminal defendant has a right to appeal under the laws of the State, the Sixth
Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel extends to the appeal as of right. Douglas v.
California, 372 U.S. 353, 355-58 (1963); see also Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (I 985) (14 th
Amendment embodies due process right to effective assistance of counsel on appeal). Assistance
of appellate counsel is ineffective if (l) counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness and (2) there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceedings would have been different. Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259,
288 (2000); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88. 691-92 (1984); cf. Schoger v. State,
148 Idaho 622, 626, 620 (20 I 0) (contemplating Strickland under Art. I, § 13 of the Idaho
Constitution).
''Generally, only when ignored issues are clearly stronger than those presented [on appeal],
will the presumption of effective assistance of counsel be overcome." Smith.. 528 U.S. at 288; cf.

3
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Mintun v. State, 144 Idaho 656, 61 (Ct.App. 2007). If"appellate counsel failed to raise a significant
~

and obvious issue, the failure could be viewed as deficient performance. If an issue which was not
raised may have resulted in a reversal of the conviction, or an order for new trial, the failure was
prejudicial." Gary v. Greer, 778 F.2d 350, 352 (7th Cir. 1985).
2. Appellate Counsel Failed to Raise Issues That Were Clearly Stronger Than the One
Raised and \Vhich Probably \Vould Uave Resulted in Reversal of Conviction
Mr. Meister's application for post-conviction relief sought a new direct appeal on the
grounds that the Idaho State Appellate Public Defender's Office ineffectually represented Mr.
Meister on appeal by failing to raise ( 1) the district court's error of allowing prosecution evidence
that Mr. Meister and a defense witness, who was key to Meister's alternative perpetrator defense,
practiced the same unconventional religion and that by virtue of the religion were of bad character
and unbelievable (R.Vol.18, pp.3868-71, 3877-79; R.Vol.17, pp.3623-32); (2) the district court's
error of allowing the jury to learn of Meister's prior trial and conviction (R.Vol.18, pp.3873-75;
R.Vol.17, pp.3632-35); and (3) the district court's error of limiting Dr. Richard Ofshe's expert
testimony, in view of federal Constitutional authority protecting an accused's right to present a
defense (R.Vol.18, pp.3890-94; R.Vol.17, pp.3653-57).
The trial record lodged on appeal in Idaho Supreme Court Case No. 39807-2012 shows
that the prosecution elicited evidence from defense witness Brian Keim that he and Mr. Meister
practiced the pagan religion of Odinism. (See generally, R.Vols.1-16, pp. 3283-3303.) Over the
defense's objections (R.Vol.15 p.3291), the State was permitted to inquire of Keim into Odinic
religious concepts of loyalty (R.Vol.15, p.3299 at. Tr., p.3613, Ls.2-5) and insinuate to the jury
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,..
that by virtue of religious notions of loyalty, Keim was lying about the alternative perpetrator Lane
,-.

Thomas' confession to the murder of Tonya Hart, in order to protect Mr. Meister, a fellow Odinist.

...

(R.Vol.16, p.3301 at Tr., p.3622.) The deputy prosecutor also twice interjected her opinion that
the "Odinistic belief is that sin is denied and contrition is denounced; that Odinists see repentance

11111

as a mark of weakness ...." (R.Vol.15, p.3299 at Tr., p.3613, Ls.17-19; cf. R.Vol.16, p.3301 at
Tr., p.3622, Ls.13-14.)
Mr. Keim further testified that Odinism often caters to white racists. (R. Vols.15-16,

~

pp.3299-3300; cf. R.Vol.17, pp.3625-28.) The combined effect of Mr. Keim's testimony and the
prosecutor's comments was that the jury was persuaded that Mr. Meister practiced a non-Christian,
white racist religion that denies sin, denounces contrition, and regards repentance as weakness,
and that, by virtue of their religious beliefs, Meister and Keim are undesirables and incredible. The
defense moved for an acquittal or new trial (R.Vol.21, pp.4551-63), which motion was denied
(R.Vol.22, p.4582), and then appealed (R. Vol.22, p.4584-87). Appellate counsel, however, did not
argue the issue.
First, even if evidence of the religion of Odinism and Mr. Keim and Mr. Meister's
association through Odinist services were admissible in order to explore bias, these subjects should
nonetheless have been excluded under I.R.E. 403 as unfairly prejudicial to the defense. The
prejudice caused by evidence of Mr. Meister and Mr. Keim's practice of a pagan, racist religion which seemingly denounces moral conventions - was simply too much in balance against the
State's purported interest in discovering bias. This especia11y the case because the State, in fact,
had no evidence of actual bias on the part of Mr. Keim.
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Second, evidence of Mr. Meister and Mr. Keim's Odinist beliefs should have been
precluded from trial under the First, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments, which prevent the
State "from employing evidence of a defendant's abstract beliefs ... when those beliefs have no
bearing on the issue being tried." Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S. 159 (1992). The prosecution's
unfounded comment that the ""Odinistic belief' is to deny sin, contrition, and repentance reveals
her intent to leverage religious prejudices of the jury, and such an appeal to "'religious prejudice
during the course of trial violates a defendant's Fifth Amendment right to a fair trial." U.S. v.
Cabrera, 222 F.3d 590, 594 (9 th Cir. 2000); Bains v. Cambra, 204 F.3d 964, 975 (9 th Cir. 2000)
(Prosecutor's generalization that Sikh religious practitioners are predisposed to violence violated
defendant's due process and equal protection rights); cf. State v. Sanchez, 142 Idaho 309,314, 127
P.3d 212,218 (Ct.App. 2005).
Moreover, implication that Mr. Meister associated with white racists while in prison tainted
Meister's character irrevocably and likely inflamed the jury against the defense. Dawson, 503 U.S.
at 165; U.S. v. Roark, 924 F.2d 1426 (8 th Cir. 1995); Sager v. Maass, 907 F.Supp. 1412, 1420-21
(D.Oregon l 995).
In addition to an argument that due process and fair trial rights were implicated by the
State's use of religion to discredit and undermine the character of the accused and defense witness

Keim (Dawson, 503 U.S. at 167; Cabrera 222 F.3d at 594), had counsel argued on appeal that the
State's use of evidence of religion against a criminal defendant is a form of governmental
infringement of substantive liberty and the Constitution, the result of appeal likely would have
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been different. See~' NAACP v. Alabama ex rel Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460-461, 463 (1958);
O'Keefe v. Van Boening, 82 F.3d 322 (9 th Cir. 1996).
In addition to the prejudicial evidence the State elicited from Mr. Keim regarding a pagan
religion of apparent moral turpitude, the State was also permitted to elicit from Keim, and from
witnesses Keith Wilde and Scott Mikolajczyk, testimony about Mr. Meister's prior conviction for
the charges he was again facing trial. Evidence of prior conviction was allowed by the district court
over defense objection (R. Vol. I 6, p.3284) and motion for mistrial (R. Vol.21, pp.4499-4503 ). The
defense appealed. (R.Vol.22, pp.4584-87) Appellate counsel ignored this issue as well.
Had appellate counsel argued that the jury had been presented with inappropriate evidence
that Mr. Meister spent a number of years in prison because at some point he was previously
convicted of the murder of Tonya Hart (R.Vol.12, p.2587 at Tr., p.932, Ls.5-8; R.Vol.15, pp.3295,
3298) and that Meister testified in some way before a grand jury related to the murder charge
(R.Vol.12, p.2630 at Tr., p.1143, Ls.20-24; R.Vol.15, p.3298), the result of appeal likely would
have been different. This is because the error of admitting this evidence violated the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments' guarantee of due process because -~information that another panel of

-

impartial jurors has already heard the case against the defendant and concluded, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that he is guilty is highly prejudicial." U.S. v. Keating, 147 F.3d 895, 902 (9th
Cir. 1998); cf. Marshall v. U.S., 360 U.S. 310, 312-13 ( 1959).

-

Lastly, appellate counsel erred with respect to the issue they did raise on appeal. Appellate
counsel argued that the district court erred by preventing defense expert testimony, because the
limitation against expert Dr. Richard Ofshe's findings that Detective Westbrook employed

7

coercive tactics when interrogating Mr. Meister went to the heart of Meister's defense that his
confession was false and the product of coercion. Appellate counsel argued that in view of this
Court's holding in State v. Almaraz, 2013 WL 1285940 at * 13-14 (April 1, 2013) and holdings in
other state jurisdictions (Miller v. State, 790 N.E.2d 763, 774 (lnd.2002); Boyer v. State, 825 So.2d
418, 419-20 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2002)), Mr. Meister's conviction must be reversed. (R.Vol.18,
pp.3890-94; R.Vol.17, pp.3653-57.) Appellate counsel however, failed to argue the issue in view
of federal Constitutional law.
Had counsel argued that under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments a criminal
defendant has a right to present a defense (Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 18-19 (1967);
Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973); Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (I 987)) and that a
trial court's robbery of this right is reversible error (Id.; Alcala v. Woodford, 334 F.3d 863, 87379 (9th Cir. 2003); Cudjo v. Ayers, 698 F.3d 752, 766 (9 th Cir. 2012)), the outcome of appeal likely
would have been different.
Moreover, appellate counsels' failure to exhaust in state court the question of error of
precluding Dr. Ofshe's testimony in view of federal Constitutional protections, and United

\i:rn.:~

Supreme Court Precedent, has resulted in a procedural bar to federal collateral review of the issue,
pursuant to 28 U .S.C. §2254, effectively stripping Mr. Meister of his right to petition the United
States District Court for writ ofhabeas corpus. Compare Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 32 (2004)
with Murry v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488-89 (1986); Freeman v. Lane, 962 F.2d 1252, 1259 (7 th
Cir. 1992).
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Because the State's use of (1) Mr. Meister's religion as evidence against. his character and
credibility; (2) Mr. Meister's prior conviction; (3) appellate counsels' failure to argue the issue
presented under favorable Federal authority; and (4) failure to preserve that issue for federal
collateral review would each be grounds for reversal of conviction (or new direct appeal, with
regard to enumeration part ''(4)"), and more so under the doctrine of cumulative error (see
application of cumulative error standard at R.Vol.18, pp.3761-3809), appellate counsels'
performance was objectively unreasonable and resulted in loss of appeal.
The district court's failure to recognize the above issues as material to whether appellate
counsels' assistance to Mr. Meister was deficient (R.Vo.21, pp.4461-22) is clear error and based
on an unreasonable determination of the facts. The factual allegations supporting a finding of
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel were not contradicted by evidence from the State, and
were neither incredible on their face nor clearly refuted by the record; therefore, the district court's
failure to hold hearing on the post-conviction claim requires reversal of summary disposition.
Martinez v. State, 126 Idaho 813, 816-17 (Ct.App.1995); Gonzalez v. State, 120 Idaho 759, 763
(Ct.App 1991 ); see also, Nunes v. Mueller, 706 F.3d 1045, 1054 (9 th Cir. 2003); Hurles v. Ryan,
706 F.3d 1021, 1038-40 (9 th Cir. 2013). However, on the present record, Mr. Meister has
sufficiently demonstrated that issues ignored by appellate counsel likely would have resulted in a
different outcome on appeal and that appellate counsels' performance did not meet professional
minimums. To protect Mr. Meister's substantial right to effective assistance of appellate counsel,
this Court should grant a new direct appeal.
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B. The District Court Erred by Summarily Dismissing Mr. Meister's Post-Conviction Claim
of Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel
1. Standard of Review
The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution guarantee to the
accused the right of effective assistance of counsel in both federal and state criminal prosecutions.
Yarborough v. Gantry~ 540 U.S. 1, 5 (2003); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14
(1970). Counsel is ineffective if (1) counsel's performance "'fell below an object standard of
reasonableness" and (2) "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Strickland v. Washington, 416 U.S.
668, 687-88 (1984); accord, McKay v. State, 148 Idaho 567 (2010).
2. Trial Counsels' Failure to Present Evidence that Mr. Meister's Confession was False was
Objectively Unreasonable and Prejudicial to Meister's Defense
Mr. Meister's primary defense was that his confession was false and the product of coercive
interrogation tactics. The defense presented the testimony of Dr. Richard Ofshe who testified to
the types of false confession (R.Vol.15, p.3123 at Tr., p.2973) and that most false confessions are
compliance false confessions (R.Vol.15, p.3213 at Tr., p.2976, Ls.5-17) in which a person makes
a decision to confess to a crime they did not commit (R.Vol.15, p.3123 at Tr., p.2973, Is. 23-25).
Dr. Ofshe explained modem interrogation techniques and why they can lead to compliance false
confessions (R.Vol.15, pp.3118-21.) The techniques described by Dr. Ofshe have become known
as the Reid method. (R.Vol.15 p.3142 at Tr., p.2979, Ls.6-12.) Dr. Ofshe testified that the Reid
method can lead to both true and false confessions. Therefore, after the confession occurs, "the
real work of the interrogation begins." (R.Vol.15, p.3127 at Tr., p.2990, Ls.4-11.) At this point,
the interrogator wants the suspect to volunteer information about the crime that he has not been
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accidentally or deliberately contaminated with. (R.Vol. 15, p.3127 at p. 2990, Ls.4-21.) Dr Ofshe
commented,
Typically, what happens in an unreliable confession is that the interrogator asks about
things that the suspect has not been contaminated with. The suspect guesses. And those
guesses are liable to be wrong, very likely to be wrong, unless they're simple things like,
was the body face up of the body face down?
(R.Vol.15, p.3128 at Tr., p.2994, Ls.4-10.) In other words, if the suspect cannot supply facts to
verify particular knowledge of the crime, the confession is unreliable.
After analyzing Mr. Meister's confession, Dr. Ofshe concluded that the statement "yields
-

numerous examples of facts Meister volunteered about the crime that are disproved or are not
corroborated by the cace facts." 1 These examples are as follows:

...

1. Mr. Meister stated that while fleeing the trailer he removed corduroy pants and a red
flannel shirt and no such clothing was found, and the only eyewitness saw a man in a
yellow flannel shirt.
2. Mr. Meister stated that he was wearing a pair of his old shoes and when those shoes are
a different size footprint than those left in the snow, and that the prints show a full tread.
3. Mr. Meister stated that he saw a police cruiser turn into the road immediately after the
shooting, and hearing sirens when no officer was at the scene at that time.
4. Mr. Meister stated that he wrapped a scarf around his face, and eyewitnesses testified
that the suspect' s face was uncovered; and
5. Mr. Meister's statement that he announced to his co-workers that he would kill
someone for $1000 was not confirmed by his coworkers .
(R.Vol.18, pp.3859-60.)
Ultimately, Dr. Ofshe was precluded by the district court from applying his theory of false

...

confessions to the facts of this case (R. Vol.15, pp.3134, 313 7 at Tr., pp.3019, 3029-32), yet

1

See Dr. Ofshe's report at R.Vol.18, pp.3843-62. This report was submitted as Exhibit at the
motion hearing held November 22, 2010 in Latah County Case No. CR-2002-1534. (See hearing
transcript at R.Vol.5, 925 - 1095.)
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evidence remained available to contradict the veracity of the confession itself. But defense counsel
failed to present it.
Mr. Meister confessed to announcing to Pizza Pipeline coworkers, sometime in late 2001,
that he would be willing to kill a person for $1000. (R.Vol.17, p.3580.) However, the facts suggest
that this comment was never made: Police interviewed Mr. Meister's former Pipeline coworkers
before and after his arrest. No coworker has stated that Mr. Meister said he would kill for money.
(See generally~ post-conviction claim 34 at R.Vol.18, pp.3955, 3965-66; R.Vol.17, pp.3720-21.)
Police reports reflect that at least four of Mr. Meister's former coworkers were asked about
whether they heard the comment. The first is Report 57 under Latah County Sheriffs Office
Incident Number 0106248 (R.Vol.20, pp.4261-62), where LCSO Detective Jennifer McFarland
memorialized that Ike Cantrell (who often worked with Meister (R.Vol.18, p.3965)), when
specifically asked, stated he never heard Mr. Meister say that he would kill for money. Reports 65,
70, 77 (R.Vol.20, pp.4266, 4271, 4274-75 respectively) reflect LCSO Detective Kurtis hall's
interview with Pipeline workers Joe Rauch, Troy Saggau, and Arie Morgan, and contain identical
information that Mr. Meister never made such an announcement in their presence.
Former LCSO Detectives Hall and McFarland both testified to other matters at Mr.
Meister's 2011 trial; witnesses Mr. Cantrall, Mr. Saggaue, and Mr. Morgan also testified.
However, none of these witnesses, nor any other witnesses, were questioned at trial about whether
Mr. Meister announced to a group of people at work that he would kill for $1000. Nor were LCSO
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Reports 57, 65, 70, and 77 offered as exhibits.2 The record in this case clearly shows that defense
counsel had ample opportunity to undermine Mr. Meister's confession on this point, but did not
take it.
Mr. Meister also confessed that Jesse Linderman stated he no longer wanted to be in a
relationship but did not want to end it with Tonya hart because she would become very upset and
might kill him or herself. (R.Vol.17, p.3582) The State attempted to corroborate this point to show
particular knowledge and motive by presenting evidence of a Spring 2001 separation between Ms.
Hart and Mr. Linderman, in which was evinced Hart's emotional distress and thoughts of suicide.
(R.Vol.12, p.2552.) Defense counsel made no move to dispute the State's contention, even though
evidence to the contrary existed. (See generally post-conviction claim 35 at R.Vol.18, pp.3966-67;
R.Vol.17, pp.3721-23.)
In 2003, Troy Saggau testified to witnessing Mr. Linderman regularly speaking at his
workplace, Pizza Pipeline, about his relationship with Ms. Hart. During at least one such
conversation, Mr. Linderman spoke of his break-up with hart in Spring 2001 and her emotional
response to it. (R.Vol.8, p.1622 at TR., p.1270.) Additionally, police reports from 2002
memorialize Mr. Saggau's statements that Mr. Linderman had said Ms. Hart went "psycho" during
the separation (language similar to that used in Meister's confession) and that Linderman was

2

Idaho Rule of Evidence 803(8) provides for the admissibility of ''investigative reports by police
and other law enforcement ... when offered by an accused in a criminal case." Under this rule,
Reports 57, 65, 70, and 77 would have been admitted if offered by defense counsel.
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afraid of Hart (again similar to language in the confession). (See, LCSO Reports 46, p.2, and 59,
p.3, at R. Vol.20, pp.4282, 4286.)
The 2011 jury did not hear this evidence- which, had the jury, would have unequivocally
put Mr. Meister's knowledge of the Hart-Linderman breakup, and the emotions surrounding it, in
the context of general knowledge among those close to, or who worked with, Jesse Linderman at
Pi1;,a Pipt:li11i.:. That context would have refuted the State's suggestion that Mr. Meister knew of

Hart-Linderman relationship details because of a conspiracy with Linderman. (R. Vol.16, p.321 7.)
Defense counsel, however, did not present the evidence that the details of the spring 2001 HartLinderman separation were general knowledge, and the jury deliberated under the State's incorrect
yet unchallenged representation that perhaps Mr. Meister did know a little too much about Ms.
Hart's and Mr. Linderman's feelings.
Mr. Meister confessed to receiving Mr. Linderman' s contact information and phone
number on the night of the murder, December 11, 2001, and then placing the slip of paper with the
information in his wallet. (R.Vol.17, p. 3586) Former LCSO Detective Kurtis Hall testified to
finding Linderman's phone number in Mr. Meister's wallet. (R.Vol.14, p.2862 at Tr., pp. 19992000.) Defense counsel did not refute this. (See generally, post-conviction claim 36 at R.Vol.18,
pp.3967-68; R.Vol.17, pp.3723-24.)
Adelphia communications services provider, however, had disclosed documents to the
prosecution that indisputably proved the number found in Mr. Meister's wallet was a pager number
belonging to Mr. Linderman, but that the pager number did not exist on December 11, 2001, the
night of the murder. (R. Vol.20, pp.4218-=24 ), and could not have been given to Meister on that
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date. The pager number came into service fully two months after the murder. (R.Vol.20, p.4224.)
Defense counsel did not introduce this evidence, allowing the jury to hear that Mr. Linderman' s
number was found in Mr. Meister's wallet. The jury could conclude nothing except that Mr.
Linderman gave Mr. Meister the phone number (it did not come out at trial that the number was
.-.

actually a pager number (R.Vol.14, p.2862)) on the night of the murder and that it was found in
Meister's wallet, in perfect corroboration of the confession. Both the State and defense counsel
allowed the jury to deliberate under that false impression.
Mr. Meister confessed to seeing a police cruiser just pulling onto North Polk Extension as
he himself arrived on the road while fleeing the murder scene. (R.Vol.17, p.3583.) But there were
no on-duty police officers on North Polk Extension at that time. (See generally post-conviction
claim 37 at R.Vol.18, pp.3968-97p; R.Vol.17, pp.3724-25.)
Jody Rismon, a LCSO Dispatcher in 2001, testified in 2003 that the six Sheriffs deputies
on duty the night of the murder were nowhere near North Polk Extension at the time of the
shooting, about I 0: 15 p.m. (R. Vol.9, pp. I 9 I 0-11.) The whereabouts of on-duty Moscow police
officers was stipulated to at the 2003 trial: no Moscow police officers were on North Polk
Extension at or near I 0: 15 p.m., with the possible exception of Sergeant Bruce Fager, who did not
recollect his location from IO to 11 p.m. that night. (R.Vol. l 0, p.2145 at Tr., pp.3197-98.) Moscow
Police Department records, however, indicate that Sergeant Fager was for that time period
executing administrative duties at the Moscow Police Department. (R. Vol.20, p.4288.)
Mr. Meister's 2011 jury did not hear this evidence. Defense counsel did not present
evidence or argument regarding the fact that Mr. Meister's confession to seeing a police cruiser on
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North Polk Extension just after the murder could not be true. The State pounced on this aspect of
the confession left open for manipulation:
"Now, they [the defense] also point to the fact that the defendant - the defendant said he
saw a cop car out there on North Polk Extension, and he heard an ambulance. Well, that
can't be because they were all out on Highway 95? Really? Have we accounted for every
single police car in Moscow, or in the county, every Latah County Sherriff s Officer- The
Sheriffs Office cruisers? Have we accounted for everything? Could it have been a fire car?
I don't know."
(R.Vol.16, p.3429 at Tr., p.4058, Ls.16-24.) The defense could have presented evidence to
foreclose this entirely anticipated argument from the State, and bolster Mr. Meister's defense that
the confession was false, but counsel neglected to do so.
Mr. Meister confessed to running east off of North Polk Extension and into a field, after
the police cruiser had driven away. (R.Vol.17, p.3583.) Defense counsel did not present the most
persuasive evidence that this was impossible, and did not argue in closing that no shoe prints were
found in the snow fleeing into a field east of North Polk Extension. (See generally, post conviction
claim 38 at R.Vol.19, pp.3970-72; R.Vol.17, pp.3725-27.)
At the 2011 trial, LCSO Sergeant Matthew Stinebaugh testified to his and other officers'
extensive search of North Polk Extension on the night of the murder, including inspecting the fresh
snow cover on the berms paralleling the road. He looked for evidence and for indication that the
suspect' s path deviated from the road. Because of the fresh snow cover at the scene, Sgt.
Stinebaugh would have been "able to see if anyone were to have left the road other than in a
driveway." (R.Vol.12 p.2607 at Tr., p.1050, Ls.19-21.) Sgt. Stinebaugh carefully "searched, went
back and forth and [was] looking along the edge of the road." (R.Vol.12, p.2612 at Tr., p.1071,
Ls.1-3.)
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The necessary corollary from Sgt. Stinebaugh's testimony is that the suspect could not have
fled from North Polk Extension into an adjacent field, because no shoe prints were found disturbing
the fresh snow at the sides of the road. This important conclusion, however, was not drawn for the
jury by defense counsel, neither by asking Sgt. Stinebuagh the predicate "Did it appear that the
.-.

fresh snow on the berms of the road had been disturbed?" nor by arguing, during closing
statements, that the absence of a disturbed snowbank or track into adjacent fields belies the flight
details given in Mr. Meister's confession.
Had Sgt. Stinebaugh been asked if it appeared anywhere on North Polk Extension that the
suspect fled off the road, he would have answered that he and three other officers (R.Vol.7, p.1475)
searched the snow at the sides of the road to see if the shoe prints deviated from the roadway
(R.Vol.7, p.1474);' at the area where the tracks were lost, they searched back and forth several
times (R.Vol.7, p.1475 at Tr., p.768, Ls.9-12); had someone fled into the fields from the road, there
was no way the person could get into the fields without stepping through the accumulated snow at
the roadside (R.Vol.7, p.1477 at Tr., p.774); and, in fact, there were no tracks breaking the fresh
snow berms (R.Vol.7, p.1479 at Tr., p.782)
Defense counsel did not develop this testimony at the 2011 trial and, during closing,
completely ignored the beneficial statements Sgt. Stinebaugh did make to the jury.
Mr. Meister confessed to putting on an old pair of shoes to discard after the murder took
place. (R.Vol.17, p.3583.) Defense counsel failed to present evidence that characteristic wear
patters of Mr. Meister's old shoes could not have left the prints found at the crime scene. (See
generally post-conviction claim 39 at R.Vol.19, pp.3972-76; R.Vol.17, pp.3727-28.)
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Undisputed evidence was produced at trial that it was Mr. Meister's longtime custom to
_,

completely wear out a pair of shoes before purchasing new ones. (R. Vol. I 5, p.3082 at Tr., p.2811 ~
Ls.4-19; cf. R.Vol.9, p.1776 at Tr., p.1889.) As Mr. Meister was an avid skateboarder around the
time of the murder, his shoes sustained characteristic wear patters in which the ball and toe region
of the sole tread would rapidly rub away, leaving the sole smooth in that portion. (R.Vol.19,
p.3971.) At trial, a pair of Mr. Meister's used Osiris Defcon shoes were admitted without dispute.
These shoes were of the same brand as the Osiris ODS shoes that left the prints at the crime scene;
both pairs were manufactured of the same material and in the same processes. (R.Vol.13, p.2780
at Tr., p.1670, L.l 9-p.1671, L.8; R.Vol.13, p.2782 at Tr., p.1678, Ls.6-21.) The Defcon shoes in
evidence were completely smooth on the ball and toe region of the sole. 3 (R. Vol.20, p.4300)
Evidence found at or near the crime scene shows that the ODS shoes that left the prints
retained defined tread in the ball/toe of the sole. 4 (R.Vol.20, p.4290.) Mr. Meister's confession that
he attired in old shoes he no longer wore, therefore, does not comport with the evidence, and raises
doubt about the confession. Dr. Ofshe even noted the inconsistency in his analysis of Mr. Meister's
confession. (R.Vol.17, p.3859.) Yet defense counsel failed to present that evidence.
Mr. Meister confessed to discarding a red flannel shirt and brown corduroy pants in the
snow in a field east of where he said he fled North Polk Extension. (R.Vol.17, p.3583.) This
confession detail, if true, should have been verifiable: The Confession was made August 29, 2002;

3

Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a color copy of the image depicting the soles of Mr. Meister's
Defcon shoes.
4
Attached hereto as Exhibit Bis a color copy of the image depicting the suspect's shoe prints
found near Ms. Hart's home .
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the murder took place December 11, 2001. An interval of eight and a half months is simply not
near enough time for such garments to decay and disappear. At the 2011 trial, former LCSO
Detective Kurtis Hall testified briefly to conducting searches, following the confession, for
clothing in the fields surrounding North Polk Extension. His testimony did Not go into Specifics.
(R.Vol.13, pp.2734-35.) No clothes were found. (Id.)
No evidence other than Det. Hall's short testimony was presented on this point; and in
closing, Deputy Prosecutor Michell Evans took full advantage of the ambiguity regarding whether
or not the clothes could have been somewhere in the fields. She persuasively argued it was very
possible the clothes were there and simply not discovered. (R.Vol.16, p.3430.)
Disturbingly, persuasive evidence to the contrary was known to the State and to defense
counsel, who did not present it. In 2003, Det. Hall testified with more precision about his search
for clothes (R. Vol. 9, pp.18 I 8, 1824-25) and that after the August 29, 2002 confession he searched
the fields extensively, "half a dozen times," in the proximity suggested in Mr. Meister's confession
to be where the clothes would have been discarded (R. Vol. 9, p.18 I 8). he found nothing. (Id.) In
addition, Gary Shutz, the owner of most of the property east of where the shoe prints were found,
passed over the majority of his property, uncultured pasture land, while mowing in Summer 2002,
and found no clothes. (R.Vol.9, p.1822) Mr. Shutz, upon questioning by Det. Hall, insisted that he
was positive there had been no discarded clothing on his property. (R.Vol.20, p.4268.)
Defense counsel did not present this evidence. They did not even argue the evidence from
Det. Hall that did come out at the 201 I trial. Instead, defense counsel allowed the jury to believe
the fields east of North Polk Extension likely could have concealed the clothes from what was
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portrayed falsely by the State as a superficial Passover by law enforcement who did not know
where to look. (See generally post-conviction claim 41 at R.Vol.19, pp.3982-84; R.Vol.17,
pp.3731-32.)
Defense counsel made a sound strategical decision to attempt to show the jury that the
-.

confession was not true, "but nonetheless failed in [their] duty to present that defense reasonably
and competently." Alcala v. Woodford, 334 F.3d 862, 871 (9 th Cir. 2003) (holding counsel
ineffective for failing to call alibi witnesses who would have been more helpful than the alibi
witnesses called). Defense counsels' strategy was to identify for the jury the coercive police tactics
used in Mr. Meister~ s August 2002 interrogation and to demonstrate that the resultant confession
was false. When the district court disallowed Dr. Ofshe's testimony about specific coercive
interrogation tactics used against Mr. Meister, the reasonable, professional recourse would have

-

been to focus on the inconsistencies of the confession - but that is not what counsel did. Rather,
they virtually abandoned the line of defense. Counsels' failure to present evidence that proves their
client's confession to murder is untrue is a deficiency in performance capable of objective
evaluation, which, in this case, at the very least, states a credible claim that counsel was not
operating in Mr. Meister's defense at the level of professional norms. See ~ DeLuca v. Lord, 77

F.3d 578, 585-88 (2 nd Cir. 1996) (Trial counsel's abandonment of strategy that was well-suited to
the facts of the case and offered a more plausible version of events found objectively unreasonable
because the defense abandoned offered the only realistic chance for avoiding murder conviction).
Because the confession was the cornerstone of the State's case and the most damning
evidence against Mr. Meister, defense counsels' failure to present persuasive evidence to dispute
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the confession amounted to abandonment of the only realistic chance the jury would find
reasonable doubt. For the purposes of Strickland v. Washington, supra, Mr. Meister has
demonstrated on post-conviction that the assistance he received from trial counsel was both
unprofessional and prejudicial, which violated his Constitutional Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. There is a

r1.'d>,H1:.1bk

probability that, had

counsel presented evidence that Mr. Meister's confession to murder was untrue, the jury would
have found reasonable doubt and acquitted Meister.
For the reasons above, the district court's conclusion that Mr. Meister failed to "raise a

..

genuine issue of material fact that counsels' tactical decisions fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness" (R.Vol.21, p.4469) was clear error and based on an unreasonable determination
of the facts from the post-conviction record. Moreover, Mr. Meister's post-conviction allegations
of counsels' deficient performance were neither incredible on their face not clearly refuted by the
record, and therefore the district court's failure to hold hearing on the claim requires reversal of
summary disposition. Martinez, 126 Idaho at 816-17; Gonzales, 120 Idaho at 763; see also, Nunes,
350 F.3d at 1054; Hurles, 706 F.3d at 1038-40.
The district court's opinion that defense counsel tactically, forwent evidence that the
confession was false in order to focus "on both an alternative perpetrator theory, and a robust
defense that the confession was coerced" (R. Vol.21, p.4469) is inappropriate speculation about
counsels' rationale, and is unsupported by the trial record, which demonstrates that counsel did
choose to attack the truthfulness of the confession, but did so in an unprofessional and

-
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Constitutionally deficient way. 5 The district court's further finding that prejudice could, in any
case, not be shown, because of overwhelming evidence of guilt (R.Vol.21, p.4470), is not
supported by a reasonable, balanced view of the case facts, which were outlined for the district
court in Mr. Meister's response to the State's motion for summary disposition. (See generally

,...

R. Vol.18, pp.3 781-98) Upon reassessment of those facts, this court should vacate Mr. Meister's
conviction, or in the alternative, reverse the district court's summary dismissal of Meister's claim
of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.
3. Trial Counsels' Failure to Present Alibi Evidence Was Obiectively Unreasonable and
Prejudicial to Mr. Meister's Defense
In addition to the attempt to show that Mr. Meister's August 29, 2002 confession was false
and coerced by police, defense trial strategy was to show that Lane Thomas committed the murder
and that Meister could not have, because he was at home at the time of the shooting. However,
defense counsel failed to present available and persuasive evidence of alibi. (See generally. postconviction claim 42 at R.Vol.19, pp.3985-88; R.Vol.17, pp.3735-39.)
Defense counsel did make some attempt to show alibi: The shooting on Tonya Hart took
place at about 10:15 p.m., December 11, 2001. (R.Vol.12, pp.2571, 2585, at Tr., pp.905, 960.)
Jeremy White testified to seeing his roommate, Mr. Meister, at home sometime between 9:30 and
I I :00, when he asked Meister ifhe wanted to order pizza. (R.Vol.16, p.3314 at Tr., p.3672, Ls. I 922.) Mr. White testified to again seeing Mr. Meister before I I :00 p.m., at which time he

5

Although courts may consider strategic choices evinced by counsel's actions, the court "may
not indulge post hoc rationalizations for counsel's decision making that contradicts the available
evidence of counsel's actions." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, I 08 (2011) (citation omitted).
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specifically recalled talking with Meister about placing an unanswered call to Pizza Pipeline.
-

(R.Vol.16, pp.3314-17.) Heather Hart testified to also receiving no answer when she called Jli.,J:i
Pipeline at about 11 :05 p.m. that night. (R. Vol.I 2, p.2560.) Mr. White testified that immediately
after the unanswered call to Piua Pipeline, at about 11 :00 p.m., he and Mr. Meister travelled
together in White's truck to Papa John's to get pizza. (R.Vol.16, p.3316 at Tr., p.3680.) Mr.
Meister's testimony corroborated that of Mr. White's. (R.Vol.16, p.3163 at Tr., pp.3189-40.) In
addition, the testimony of Jenifer Young (Crespo) placed Mr. Meister at home not long after 11 :00

,..

p.m., when and where she observed Meister apparently just out of the shower and in his bathrobe
(R.Vol.16, p.3328 at Tr., p.3728, L.12; R.Vol.16, p.3329, at Tr., p.3731) and that Meister and
White had also recently finished a meal of pizza (R.Vol.16, p.3328 at Tr., p.3728, Ls.11-20). Ms.
Young testified that she made this observation only minutes before driving out to the scene of Ms.
Hart's murder. (R.Vol.16, p.3329 at Tr., p.3731.) When Ms. Young's recollection of the night's
timeline of events is adjusted by the evidence given by LCSO Detective Hall that Young arrived
at the scene at about 11 :40 p.m. (R.Vol.16, pp.3346-47), then Young likely observed Meister at
home at about 11 :30 p.m ..
Whether and when the unanswered call to Pi//,i Pipeline was placed by Mr. White were
crucial to establishing the time frame of Mr. Meister's alibi. To that end, counsel elicited from
Pizn Pipeline worker, Troy Saggau. testimony that P(//a Pipeline records indicate that no pizza

orders were taken between 10:42 p.m. and 12:06 a.m. the night of December 11, 2001. (R.Vol.14,
p.3009 at Tr., p.2520.) Ike Cantrell testified that he ""sort of' recalled not answering phones for a
short period that night. (R.Vol.14, p.2962 at Tr., p.2399, Ls.6-21.)
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However given the uncertainty of the witnesses' recollections concerning the unanswered
call to Piua Pipeline, the State had ample ammunition to assault Mr. Meister's alibi defense:

~

,...

i-.

So, approximately 28 minutes [For LCSO Sergeant Earl Aston (R.Vol.13, pp.2763-65)] to
walk from the trailer to the defendant's home. Now, that's walking. Obviously, the
defendant was running a lot faster than Sergeant Aston was walking it. And if you
remember, Vern Grotjohn testified that the span between the footprints was consistent with
the defendant running.
So, lets say it took him 20 minutes to run home. That would have put him home around
I 0:35 p.m. But we know that's probably not likely because he did testify that he did take
some sort of deviation and hid for just a little bit of time. But we also know that he - you
got to believe that he wants to get home as soon as he can because it looks suspicious out
there hiding in the dark.
So lets just say it took him half an hour. That puts him at I 0;45 p.m. getting home. Even if
you want to give him an extra fifteen minutes of wandering around the neighborhood, that
puts him at 11 :00 p.m. when he got home.
Now, Jeremy White said he was at home on the computers anywhere between 30 to 60
minutes before they called for pizza. He told Hall that that could have been anywhere from
I 0:00 p.m. to midnight when they called for pizza. And midnight is more consistent with
what Meister told Westbrook back on August 29, 2002. That gave David plenty of time to
kill Tonya Hart and get home for Jeremy White to see him and go for pizza, if that really
occurred. Jeremy White does not give David Meister an Alibi.
(R.Vol.16, p.3409 at Tr., p.3976, L.8-p.3977, L.12.)
Now, the alibi, no answering the telephone at Pizza Pipeline. I believe Ike Cantrell testified
there was a call. And Rijel Glasebrook is the person who usually stayed in and made the
pizzas, and then Ike did the delivery. But there was one where they exchanged. Rijel needed
to go pick up something at a friend's house, and so she took one of the deliveries, leaving
Ike to presumably make pizzas and answer the phone.
At that point, he said at some point he- well, obviously there were some calls missed. We
know that - well, at least one, one known phone call. Heather Hart called at 11 :05, and it
wasn't answered. Does that mean there was this big long hour or so of time where the
phone wasn't answered? There is no proof of that.
(R.Vol.16, p.3430, at Tr., p.4060, L.24-p.4061, L. 15.)
The State's argument, however, could have been foreclosed and Meister's alibi bolstered
greatly, had defense counsel presented the testimony from Rijel Glasbrook and Joe Roach. First.
Defense counsel neglected strong evidence from Ms. Glasbrook concerning the temporary store
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closure and decision to stop answering Pi//,1 Pipeline phones around 11:00 p.m. the night of the
murder. At the 2003 trial, Ms. Glasbrook testified confidently to the following: ( 1) that Jesse
Linderman left Pipeline around 10:30 p.m. to respond to an emergency at his home; (2) that she
and her coworker (Cantrell) stopped taking calls and started to close the store after Linderman
called around 11 :00 p.m .. telling them to close because he would not be returning; and 93) that she
opened Pipeline again upon learning that the store manager (Troy Saggau) was coming in to help
operate the store for the rest of the evening and normal hours. (R. Vol. I 0, p.2014.) This evidence
is probative of whether Mr. White made an unanswered call to Pipeline around 11 :00 p.m. - and
yet the 2011 jury did not hear from Rijel Glasebrook.
Second, defense counsel failed to properly investigate and present evidence from Pipeline
worker Joe Rauch. Mr. Rauch was a day-shift manager who possessed keys to lock up Pizza
Pipeline. (R.Vol.10, p.2018 at Tr., p.2772-73.) In the evenings, he frequented bars in downtown
Moscow in proximity to Pipeline. (R.Vol.10, pp. 2010-20.) Both Mr. White and Mr. Meister
testified to seeing Mr. Rauch at

ilk'

Papa John's parking lot. (R.Vol.15, pp.3163-64; R.Vol.16,

pp.3314-15.) (The Moscow Papa John's sits directly across the street from The Alley, a bar
frequented by Rauch at the time (R.Vol.10, pp.2013-13 at Tr.. pp.2750-51; R.Vol.17, p.3738).)
Another person was with Mr. Rauch, possibly Ike Cantrell. (R.Vol.10, pp.2014, 2019; R.Vol.16,
p.3314.) Mr. Rauch told Mr. White and Mr. Meister that he had learned Mr. Linderman left
Pipeline in an emergency, and explained that this is why Pipeline had closed. (R.Vol.9, pp. 1870,
1872, and 1965 at Tr., p.2561, Ls.19-24; R.Vol.10, p.2022: cf. R.Vol.10, pp.2012-13 at Tr.,
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pp.2750-51.) Although he obviously had important evidence to give, Mr. Rauch was not called at
Mr. Meister's 2011 trial.
Had Mr. Rauch been called to testify, the evidence suggests Rauch would have been
expected to say ( 1) that the night of December 11, 2001, Ike Cantrell left Pipeline to search for
and locate him in downtown Moscow (R.Vol.10, pp.2012-13, 2014, 2018, 2019, at Tr., pp. 275051, 2756, 2772-73, 2776); (2) that he then went to Pipeline at Cantrell's request, where he received
a call from LCSO Dispatcher Jody Rismon at 10:58 p.m., in which she informed Rauch that
Linderman would not be returning and to go ahead and close Pipeline (R.Vol.13, pp.2692-92, at
Tr., p.1391, L.20-p.11392, L.15; cf. R.Vol.20, p.4313; cf. R.Vol.10, p.2011); and (3) that he did
recall seeing both Meister and White at the Papa John's parking lot (see Exhibit C, Interview with
Joe Rauch, at 33:30 minutes cf. R.Vol.15, pp.3163; R.Vol.16, pp.3314-15). 6
Mr. Rauch's and Ms. Glasebrook's evidence corroborates Mr. Meister's and Mr. White's
versions of the events and places Meister at Papa John's firmly prior to 10:58 p.m .. Necessarily,
this evidence pushes back the time in which Mr. White called Pipeline and received no answer,
conservatively to around 10:50 p.m., allowing ten minutes time for White and Meister to drive
downtown, talk to Rauch, and for Rauch to proceed to Pipeline where he then spoke with Rismon
at 10:58 p.m ..

6

Attached hereto as Exhibit C is a CD containing three audio recordings of interviews with
Jeremy White, Joe Rauch, and Jeff Raschetz, which were submitted to the district court as
Exhibits 22, 40, and 43, respectively, of Petitioner's Declaration in Support of Second Amended
Petition. (R.Vol.20, pp.4235, 4314, 4322.)
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There was no reasonable strategy for defense counsel to neglect important alibi evidence the best evidence on alibi time frame. "'[N]otwithstanding the imprecision of [Glasebrook's and
Rauch's accounts], the addition of their testimony may [result] in a different verdict because it was
consistent with [the defendant's] account and would have created more equilibrium in the evidence
presented to the jury.' This is so because the testimony ]buttressed [the defendanfs] account on
this crucial point. ... "' Luna v. Cambra, 306 F.3d 954, 961-62 (9 th Cir. 2002) (Quoting Brown v.
Ayers, 137 F.3d 1154, 1157-58 (9 th Cir. 1998) (brackets and quotation marks omitted.
In this case, "[t]rial counsel made a sound strategic choice to present an alibi defense, but
nonetheless failed in [their] duty to present that defense reasonably and competently." Alcala, 334
F.3d at 871 (defense counsel's presentation of four witnesses in attempt to establish alibi held
nonetheless ineffective assistance of counsel because counsel failed to present most persuasive
witnesses on the specific time frame in dispute). Because Ms. Glasebrook's testimony, and Mr.
Rauch's testimony, in combination with that of Ms. Rismon, shores up and makes much more
plausible Mr. Meister's alibi, counsels' error in failing to present that evidence was prejudicial to
Mr. Meister's defense-there is a reasonable probability that the jury would have acquitted Meister
in view of evidence that he could not have committed the murder of Ms. Hart at IO; 15 p.m. and
returned home prior to 10:50 p.m ..
The district court's summary dismissal of the above post-conviction claim of ineffective
assistance of trial counsel was, therefore, clear error and based on an unreasonable determination
of the facts on record: Meister's post-conviction allegation that counsel was Constitutionally
deficient for failing to present alibi evidence is neither incredible on its face nor clearly refuted by
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the record, and therefore the district court's failure to hold hearing on the claim requires reversal
of summary disposition. Martinez, 126 Idaho at 816-17; Gonzalaes, 120 Idaho at 762; see also
Nunes, 350 F.3d at 1054; Hurles, 706 F.3d at 1038-40. However, on the present record, Mr. Meister
has shown that his right to effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments has been violated: failure to present alibi evidence is objectively unreasonable and
prejudicial (Strickland, supra) because there is a reasonable probability that the jury would have
acquitted Mr. Meister if it had learned that Meister could not have committed the murder of Ms.
Hart and returned home where he was seen by his roommate before 10:50 p.m. on these grounds,
the Court should vacate Mr. Meister's conviction.
4. Trial Counsel's Failure to Present Evidence of an Alternative Perpetrator was Objectively
Unreasonable and Preiudicial to Mr. Meister's Defense
Inexplicably, trial counsei failed to present evidence to support their strategy to show that
lane Thomas, and not Mr. Meister, killed Ms. Hart. (See generally, post-conviction claim 43 at
R.Vol.19, pp.3992-95; R.Vol.17, pp.3739-40.)
Evidence was presented that Mr. Thomas likely killed Ms. Hart in a botched drug robber:
(R.Vol.15, pp. 3266-67, 3270, at Tr., pp.3480-83, 3495); had opportunity to perform the killing
and was in the area of the homicide when it occurred (R. Vol. I 5, p.3267 at Tr., p.3496); fit the
physical description of the shooter (R.Vol.13, p.2640; R.Vol.15, p.3227, 3269-70); wore a shoe
size that matched the suspecfs shoe prints at the scene (R.Vol.13, pp.2791-92; R.Vol.15, p.3269
at 3492); and had behaved oddly the day after the shooting, in a way that suggested his involvement
with the crime (R.Vol.16, pp.3369 at Tr., pp.3892-93).
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In addition, Brian Keim (R.Vol.15, pp.3295-96 at Tr., pp.3597-99) and Michael Scanlon
(R.Vol.16, pp.3303-04) testified to the effect that Mr. Thomas had confessed to them,
independently, that he had killed Ms. Hart and that he did so because Hart resisted his attempt to
rob her of drugs. However the State's general cross-examination of Keim and Scanlon suggested
that Mr. Thomas's statement to both Keim and Scanlon (who were incarcerated with Thomas)
were lies created to impress fellow inmates. (R.Vol.16, p.3433 at Tr.• p.4073.)
However, there existed further evidence of Mr. Thomas's admissions to the murder that
would have supported the defense's alternative perpetrator theory and refuted the State's argument
that Thomas lied about his involvement in murder to impress fellow jail inmates. Mr. Thomas
made admissions not only to inmates, but also to people he was acquainted with in the normal
course of his life: In November 2004, Mr. Thomas threatened to kill one Lacie Roach at her home
in Lewiston, Idaho, and in the process stated he had killed a woman before and that Mr. Meister
was "doing time" for that murder. (R. Vol.20, pp.4316-17, 4319-21.)
On September 27, 2011, one Jeff Raschetz informed LCSO Detective Tim Besst that
sometime in 2011, at Raschetz''s home, Mr. Thomas stated that he was the person who actually
killed Tonya Hart and that he shot her in the face over a drug dispute. (See Exhibit C, Interview
with Jeff Raschetz.)
The evidence from Ms. Roach and Mr. Raschetz was complementary to the alternative
perpetrator defense and would have foreclosed the argument that Thomas implicated himself in

,..,

murder to impress fellow inmates while incarcerated. Counsels' failure to present the evidence
was objectively unreasonable. Foster v. Wolfenbarger, 687 F.3d 702, 708 (6th Cir. 2012)
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(Counsel's assistance ineffective because decision not to pursue evidence which was consisted
with and complementary to line of defense that was pursued was unreasonable). Defense counsel
made a reasonable strategic choice to put on a defense that an alternative perpetrator killed Ms.
Hart, but neglected "to present that defense reasonably and competently (Alcala, 334 F.3d at 871 ),"
and caused prejudice to Mr. meister's alternative perpetrator defense by allowing the prosecution
to undermine Thomas's inculpatory statements by construing them as lies to impress other inmates.
Strickland, supra.
The district court's summary dismissal of Mr. Meister's post-conviction allegation that
defense counsel was ineffective for failing to present evidence of the alternative perpetrator was
clear error and based on an unreasonable determination of the facts on record, and therefore the
district court's failure to hold a hearing in the claim requires reversal of summary disposition.
Martinez, 126 Idaho at 816-17; Gonzales, 120 Idaho at 763; see also Nunes, 350 F.3d at 1054;
Hurles, 706 F.3d at 1038-40. However, on the present record, Mr. Meister has established that his
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to effective assistance of trial counsel has been violated,
and the Court should vacate his conviction.
5. Trial Counsels' Failure to Oppose the Prosecution's Misconduct was Objectively
Unreasonable and Prejudicial to Mr. Meister's Defense and Right to Fair Trial
Defense counsel failed to object to prejudicial testimony from LCSO Corporal Scott
Mikolajczyk, on the grounds that the state did not disclose his testimony. (See generally post
conviction claim 22 at R.Vol.18, pp.3916-18; R.Vol.17, pp.3690-93.) Cpl. Mikolajczyk testified
that Mr. Linderman appeared to lack emotion the night on Tonya Hart's death. (R.Vol.12, p.2629
at Tr., p.l 135, 1138, Ls.2-5.) Cpl. Mikolajczyk testimony about Mr. Linderman's lack of emotion

-
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was one of the most important pieces of evidence the State offered to prove Linderman's motive.

-

However, despite discovery requests, the State did not disclose the substance of Cpt.
Mikolajczyk's evidence to the defense prior to trial, as required under I.C.R. 16(b)(6):
. . . . The prosecuting attorney shall also furnish, upon written request, the
statements made by the prosecution witnesses or prospective witnesses to the prosecuting
attorney's agents or to any official involved in the investigation process of the case ....
Had counsel objected and moved to strike Cpt. Mikolajczyk's testimony under Rule
l 6(b)( 6), the district court likely would have granted the motion and excluded a major component
of the State's case regarding Mr. Linderman's alleged motive, and thus the State's case regarding
Mr. Meister's alleged motive would have been far less persuasive. For the purposes of Strickland
v. Washington, there was no reasonable trial strategy in failing to make an objection that would
have been sustained and diminished the State's case on a crucial point. See ~ , Hudson v.
Lockhart, 670 F.Supp. 891, 898-99 (E.D.Ark 1986) (Counsel's failure to object to surprise witness
held ineffective assistance of counsel); Government of Virgin Islands v. Fortte, 865 F.2d 59, 63
(3 rd Cir. 1989) (trial counsel held ineffective for failing to make reasonable objection).
Defense counsel failed to object to prejudicial comments from Deputy Prosecutor.
Michelle Evans. that implied Mr. Meister and a key defense witness practiced a pagan religion that
denies sin, denounces contrition, and regards repentance as weakness. (see generally postconviction claim 25 at R.Vol.18, pp.3928-30; R.Vol.17; pp.3618-3701.) Under the pretense of
exploring potential bias, Ms. Evans questioned Brian Keim about his association with Mr. Meister
at Odinist services and the substance of Odinist religious beliefs, then dramatically injected her
views on the religion of Odinism. "Evans, then, standing in view of the jury, lifted what appeared
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to be a printout of a document or note, read this material silently, looking up at Keim, and testified
fraudulently (while giving the impression of quoting her reference) about the beliefs of Odinism .
. . ." (R.Vol.18, p.3929.) She stated in the form of a question:
Isn't it true that the Odinistic belief is that sin is denied and contrition denounced; that
Odinists see repentance as a mark of weakness?
(R. Vol. I 5, p.3299 at Tr., p.3613, ls. I 7- I 9.) Ms. Evans then elicited a response from Mr. Keim to
the effect that killing a defenseless girl is not considered an act of honor among Odinists, to which
Evans replied by suggesting that Odinists lack normal notions of morality:
But, of course, Odinism doesn't see repentance-or sees repentance as a mark of weakness?
(R.Vol.16, p.3301 at Tr., p.3622, Ls.4-14.)
Ms. Evan's comments about the "'Odinistic belief' served no purpose in the State's
purported reason of exploring bias, but rather were false statements about the beliefs of Odinism,
made for the purpose of denigrating Mr. Meister's and Mr. Keim"s credibility and character, and
to attempt to appeal to the jury's religious prejudices. Ms. Evans's implication that Mr. Meister
and Mr. Keim are undesirables and less credible by virtue of their relgion was improper, and a
violation of Mr. Meister's First, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. See supra,
Dawson v. Deleware, 503 U.S. 159, 168 (1992); U.S. v. Cabrera, 222 F.3d 590,594 (9 th Cir. 2000)
("Appeals to ... religious prejudices ... violate a defendant's Fifth Amendment right to fair trial");
Bains v. Cambra, 204 F.3d 964, 975 (9 th Cir. 2000) (prosecutor's generalization that Sikh religious
practitioners are predisposed to violence violated defendant's due process and equal protection
rights); State v. Sanchez, 142 Idaho 309, 315, 127 P.3d 212, 218 (Ct.App.2005). had counsel

...

moved to strike Ms. Evans's comments on this ground, the district court likely would have granted
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the motion, for the reason it articulated when later precluding Ms. Evans from making such

..

comments again during her closing arguments (R.Vol.16, p.3402 at Tr., p.3947, L.10 - p.3948,
L.20.)
In addition, Ms. Evans's comments defining the ''Odinistic belief' were clearly calculated
to shock and inflame the jury, and to appeal to prejudice. Had counsel moved to strike on this
ground, the district court likely would have granted the motion because "improper methods
calculated to produce a wrongful conviction" (Berger v. U.S., 295 U.S. 75, 88 (1935)) by
"appeal[ing] to the passions, fears, and vulnerabilities of the jury" is fundamentally unfair and a
violation of Mr. Meister's due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. U.S. v.
Weatherspoon, 410 F.3d 1142, 1149 (9 th Cir. 2005).
Defense counsel failed to object to Ms. Evans's improper assault on Mr. Meister's
credibility. (See generally post-conviction claim 26 at R.Vol.18, p.3930-32; R.Vol.17, pp.370103.) During the State's closing argument, Ms. Evans stated that
[Meister] takes the witness stand with everything to gain by lying, he says he didn't do it.
He wants you to believe he's now telling the truth. That's all backwards.
There's not - there is so much to say, there were so many contradictions, so much that is
unbelievable in the defendant's testimony, I cannot possibly address it all. ...
(R.Vol.16, p.3412 at Tr., p.3989, L.20- p.3990, L.8.)
[Meister] was confusing. He was all over the map. He rambled, was inconsistent and he
was unbelievable.
He had lots of time to come up with his trial testimony and this was the best he could do.
(R.Vol.16, p.3418 at Tr., p.4010, Ls.8-12.)
Ms. Evans is clear that she believes Mr. Meister lied to the jury. However, her opinion,
above, is not given with references and contrast to testimony or other evidence from which
dishonesty permissibly could be inferred, nor were her statements made in response to arguments
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from defense counsel. Ms. Evans rendered her bald opinion about Mr. Meister's credibility. Had
defense counsel objected on this ground, the district court likely would have sustained it because
a deputy prosecutor commits misconduct by injecting her opinions, impeaching a defendant's
credibility by fundamentally unfair means. See generally, Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 61 O( 1976); see
also, U.S. v. Wright, 625 F.3d 583, 610-12 (9 th Cir. 2010) (prosecutor's numerous references to
his own impressions including "I think what the defendant said ... was so completely iIJogical it
was absolutely ridiculous," were improper because of personal opinion).
Counsel did not object to Ms. Evans's personal attack on Mr. Meister's credibility, even
though counsel had advance notice (and every reason to believe) that Evans would make this
attack,just as it was made in Meister's first trial. (R.Vol.10, pp.2160, 2180 at Tr., pp.3257., 3338.)
Defense counsel could have objected or moved in limine outside the jury's presence, but didn't
object at all.
Ms. Evan's injurious comments did not stop with Mr. Meister's credibility. Ms. Evans,
additionally, and powerfully, argued that the jury should believe law enforcement officers over
Mr. Meister concerning the events of the unrecorded August 29, 2002 interrogation, because,
between the two sides, "[W]ho has the most incentive to be dishonest about what happened?"
(R.Vol.16, p.3432 at Tr., p.4069, Ls.9-17.)
Ms. Evans's rhetoric and contrast was an inappropriate observation of the age-old
controversy in trial where a defendant's version of events differs from law enforcement's; and was
unfair to Meister because the imprimatur given the government station of the officers, the
untenable stigma from being criminally accused, and because "Credibility is a matter to be decided

...
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,
by the jury, and prosecutors have been admonished time and again to avoid statements that, if the
...

defendant is innocent [or honest], government agents must be lying." U.S. v. Sanchez, 176 F.3d
1214, 1224 (9 th Cir. 1999). Again. defense counsel made no objection, even though they had

--

foreknowledge Ms. Evans would make the statement. (R.Vol.10,b p.2184 at Tr., p.3351.)
Ms. Evans's unfair suggestion that a defendant possesses more incentive to lie than do law
enforcement was bolstered by the State's use of repetitive rebuttal testimony regarding the events
of Mr. Meister's interrogation and confession: Mr. Meister's interrogator's were summoned during
the State's rebuttal to give testimony identical to their prior testimony during the State's case-inchief. And defense counsel did not object. (See generally post-conviction claim 32 at R. Vol.18,

-

pp.3941-44; R.Vol.17, pp.3704-06.)
Former LCSO Detective Kurtis Hall and ISP Detective Edward Westbrook testified for the
State that Mr. Meister received a complete Miranda warning at the start of the August 29, 2002
interrogation (R.Vol.13-14, pp.2728, 2868-70 at Tr., pp.1532, 2025-26); that during the
interrogation, officers did not threaten Meister with the death penalty or promise him leniency if
he confessed (R.Vol.13-14, pp.2732, 2920 at Tr., pp.1550, 2231 ); that interrogators never
mentioned the shooter was seen wearing a plaid shirt (R.Vol.14, p.2919 at Tr., p.2228); and that
Meister appeared lucid and sober (R.Vol.14, p.2885 at Tr., p.2093). Mr. Meister's testimony
contradicted each of these points.
The State then, during its rebuttal, called both Det. Hall and Det. Westbrook to repeat their
version of events (R.Vol.16, pp.3344-45, 3356, 3357, 3358.) In this way, the credibility of
Detectives Hall and Westbrook was enhanced and their version of events pronounced over Mr.

...
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Meister's by the unfair advantage of repeating their evidence. The detective's rebuttal testimony
was identical to the testimony given during the State's case-in-chief and offered nothing new that
would clarify or rehabilitate the detective witnesses or to provide new insight into the dispute
between Meister and the detectives concerning the events of the interrogation, and so was clearly

-

beyond the scope of rebuttal. As such, the repetitive testimony should have been excluded under
I.R.E. 403 as cumulative evidence which prejudiced the defense by unfairly bolstering State's
witnesses and impeaching Mr. Meister concerning the contended issue of what exactly happened
during the unrecorded August 29, 2002 interrogation. Because the improper rebuttal testimony
was not excluded, Mr. Meister's Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment due process right to a
fair trial was violated, and defense counsels' failure to object was Constitutionally deficient
performance under the Sixth Amendment.
Defense counsels' failure to object served no objectively reasonable strategy - what
advantage would be gained from Mr. Meister's unfair impeachment? - and allowed the State to
gain the upper hand by improper means in the dispute about the interrogation tactics detectives

-

used on August 29, 2002, while at the same time greatly prejudicing Meister's defense that his
confession was false and the product of coercion.
Defense counsel failed moreover, to object to Ms. Evans's false statement that Mr. Meister
lied at trial in order to conform his testimony to the theories posed by Dr. Richard Ofshe regarding
interrogation tactics that can lead to false confessions. (See generally post-conviction claim 27 at
R.Vol.18, pp.3932-37; R.Vol.17, pp.3703-04.)
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The testimony of Dr. Ofshe was a foundation stone in defense strategy of proving that false
confessions can and do arise in scenarios like that of Mr. Meister's August 2002 interrogation. At
trial in 2011, Dr. Ofshe testified to certain sophisticated and coercive police tactics that can
produce false confessions. Mr. Meister's testimony about the August 2002 interrogation suggested
the use of such tactics. To counter that correlation, Ms. Evans argued at closing that "Mr. Meister
tailored his testimony [to Dr. Ofshe's], his hired expert." (R.Vol.16, p.3432 at Tr., p.4069, Ls.17-

18.)
Ms. Evans did not say how Mr. Meister tailored his testimony - because she could not,
because her claim is false. Mr. Meister's testimony regarding the August 2002 interrogation has
been consistent - the substance of his 2011 testimony and his prior 2003 testimony is identical. A
detailed comparison of the 2011 and 2003 transcripts in this regard is provided at R. Vol. I 8,

,..,

pp.3932-35.
Ms. Evan's false comment was fundamentally unfair to Mr. Meister and constituted
misconduct. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976); Berger, 295 U.S. at 88.) Defense counsels'
failure to make an objection which likely would have been sustained was objectively unreasonable,
and prejudiced the defense in this instance by allowing the State to undercut Dr. Ofshe's and Mr.
Meister's testimony pertaining to the defense that the confession was false and the product of
coercion.
Defense counsel failed to object to the State's introduction of evidence that suggested Mr.
Meister possessed criminal tendencies that he carried on with while imprisoned after his first
criminal conviction. (See generally, post-conviction claims 28 and 31 at R.Vol.18, pp.3937-38,
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3940-41; R.Vol.17, pp.3706-07.) The process of undermining Mr. Meister's character started with
the State's use of testimony about Meister's alleged anti-social tendencies. Duane Scott testified
that:
Over the course of years I knew [Meister], he was the kind of person that would try to get
away with stuff. And he trusted me to tell me what it was he was doing. And for him to
confess to something said to me that he must have done it.
(R.Vol.13, p.2802 at Tr., p.1759, L.24- p.1760, L.6.)
[Meister] had trusted me, and he would - he would go out and do mischievous things, and
he would tell me about it, shooting paint balls at houses.
He told me stuff. So, for him to say he's taking care of some dirty business., and I didn't
want to know anything about it said to me, that's on another level of just light vandalism
or mischief or the types of things.
(R.Vol.13, p.2803 at Tr., p.1763, L. 14- p.1764, L.6.)
Defense counsel did not object to Mr. Scott's opinion that Mr. Meister was guilty and did
not object to Scott's testimony that Meister possessed criminal propensities. This evidence of bad
character went unchallenged and was fortified by Ms. Evans' s introduction of extrinsic evidence
that Mr. Meister continuously violated prison rules by tattooing other inmates. Ms. Evans injected
the following while cross-examining witness Brian Keim:
[Evans:] And so, Mr. Meister's also tattooing in prison, isn't he?
[Keim:] He could have been, but I dido 't know if he was. So ...
[Evans:] Did you get a tattoo from him?
[Keim:] No.
[Evans:] Do you know people who did?
[Keim:] No. I didn't know that he was tattooing, if he was. So ...
(R.Vol.16, p.3300 at Tr., p.3617, L.25-p.3618, L.8.)
The state had no evidence that Mr. Meister tattooed Mr. Keim, and did not

any on

cross. Whether he tattooed Mr. Keim or other inmates was totally irrelevant, and prejudiced Mr.
Meister with character evidence of a general disregard for rule of law. Defense counsel did not
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object, even though they had the benefit of hearing the inadmissible testimony on proffer, outside
the jury's presence (R.Vol.16, p.3290 at Tr., p.3577 L.18-p.3578, L.5.) and could have objected

-

without impressing the jury. Failure to object, therefore, served no reasonable strategy.
Lastly, defense counsel did not object when Ms. Evans, in closing, summarized the trial
rights of a criminally accused defendant, and implied that Mr. Meister, as such, has and enjoys
benefits he does not deserve, because, Evans argued, he killed Ms. Hart without giving her the
courtesy of the same due process he now received:
Now, the defendant is entitled to many rights, the presumption of innocence, a trial by jury.
The Court carefully reviews evidence to make sure everything you here is proper for your
consideration; that it's relevant; that it's not overly prejudicial. It's a very careful process,
and it should be. It's designed to carefully protect the rights of the defendant. And that's
what we in our society want.
However Tonya Hart had no such process. The defendant didn't give her any presumptions
or protections. With two shots, he acted as her judge, jury and executioner without due
process of law. But this time it's different because you can stop him. It's unpleasant - as
unpleasant and difficult as it can be to render judgment, to look the defendant in the eye
and say he's guilty, that's what the evidence compels you to do.
(R.Vol.16, p.3419 at Tr., p.4015, L.16- p.4016, L.7.) (See generally post-conviction claim 29 at
R.Vol.18, pp.3938-39; R.Vol.17, pp.3707-08.) it is noteworthy that an identical comment was
made by the deputy prosecutor in Mr. Meister's 2003 trial. (R.Vol.10, p.2161 at Tr., pp.3259-60.)
In 2003 as in 2011, the comment was not made in regard to relevant evidence or to
questions pertaining to credibility, but was made to inflame the passions of the jury. 7 Defense

7

It is worth noting that the jury was also aware that Mr. Meister was being tried for a second
time. (See herein at section Argument (A)(2).) In an inflamed state, the jury likely counted a
second trial against Meister as an example of due process Ms. Evans implied was undeserved.
Moreover, Ms. Evan's argument that Mr. Meister was undeserving of the due process trial rightand her additional comments that Meister, a criminal defendant, possessed more incentive to lie
about the circumstances of the interrogation than did the detectives, and that Meister also
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counsel failed to object to, or otherwise attempt to prevent, the anticipated comment from Ms.
Evans; which failure offered no strategic advantage and constituted ineffective assistance of
counsel. See~' Dubria v. Smith, 197 F.3d 390, 402-03 (9 th Cir. 1999).
In view of the manifold examples of trial misconduct outlined in this section, the district

-

court's summary dismissal of Mr. Meister's post-conviction claims regarding trial counsels'
failure to take action to prevent or remedy the State's misconduct was clear error. Regarding,
further, the State's use of an undisclosed witness who testified to Jesse Linderman's apparent lack

~

of emotion the night of his fiance's death, the district court found no prejudice to Meister because,
the court wrote, it would not have granted a motion to exclude or strike the undisclosed testimony.
The district court did not articulate its reason for that determination. (R.Vol.21, p.4467.)

•

Regardless, the district court is in error: The State was required to disclose the content of witness
Cpl. Mikolajczyk's testimony under I.C.R. 16(b)(6), and because it did not, due process required
that witness to be excluded or have his testimony stricken.
Regarding counsels' failure to object, and preserve for direct appeal, the State's
inappropriate rebuttal case, the district court did not mention or analyze the merits of the claim;
but, rather, appears to have overlooked the issue completely. (See, R.Vol.21, pp.4466-69.)

-

fabricated testimony to conform it to Dr. Ofshe's theory regarding false confessions- "occurred
during [her] rebuttal argument and therefore were the last words from an attorney that were
heard by the jury before deliberations." U.S. v. Carter, 236 F.3d 777, 788 (6 th Cir. 2001). "Given
the timing, the impact was likely to be significant, and the court [and counsel] did not intervene."
U.S. v. Sanchez, 659 F.3d 1252, 1259 (9 th Cir. 2011).
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The district court does, however, write that Mr. Meister's claim that "he was denied
~

effective assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed to object or move to strike certain
questions and arguments by the prosecutor" (R. Vol.21, p.4468), which arguably can be construed
to incorporate the otherwise overlooked post-conviction claims. The district court dismissed these
claims for failure to present a "genuine issue of material fact that trial counsels' representation
violated an objective standard of reasonableness" (Id.), and noted with respect to Mr. Meister's
claims of improper comments "that counsel is given considerable latitude in their presentation."
(Id.)
The district court's conclusion is an over-generalization and in this case is at odds with
Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment due process guarantees, because, "while [the prosecutor]
may strike hard blows, [she] is not at liberty to strike foul ones, and must refrain from improper
methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction." Berger v. U.S., 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
The prosecution assaulted Mr. Meister's credibility by fundamentally unfair means,
particularly impacting Meister's testimony about the August 2002 interrogation and events leading
to his false confession. The State's misconduct was prejudicial to Mr. Meister's defense that his
confession was coerced. The State's additional use of bad character evidence against Mr. Meister
likewise was totally inappropriate and tainted Meister with a bad general reputation and denied
him a fair opportunity to defendant against the criminal charges. See Washington v. Hofbauer, 228
F.3d 689, 699-700 (6 th Cir. 2000). "[W]e have not here a case where the misconduct of the
prosecuting attorney was slight of confined to a single instance, but one where such misconduct
was pronounced and persistent, with a probable cumulative effect upon the jury which cannot be
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disregarded as inconsequential." Berger, 295 U.S. at 89. The degree of prosecutorial misconduct
"'so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process."'
Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986) (quoting Donnelly v. De Christoforo, 416 U.S.
637, 643 (1974).
There is no reasonable trial strategy for defense counsel to acquiesce in the many examples
of prosecutorial misconduct described above, and their failure to oppose the State's actions
deprived Mr. Meister of his right to fair trial and Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to
effective assistance of trial counsel. Dubria, 197 F.3d at 402-03.
Moreover, the district court's conclusion that, even if trial counsels' performance was
deficient, Mr. Meister "cannot establish that the outcome of the case would have been different"
if not for the errors (R. Vol.21, p.4468) is based on an incorrect interpretation of law. Rather, Mr.
Meister is required only to show a "reasonably probability" that the outcome of the trial would
have been different, which is less burdensome than to show that the outcome "would have been
different." Lombright v. Schriro, 490 F.3d 1103, 1121 (9 th Cir. 2007); Stanley v. Bartley~ 465 F.3d
810, 813 (7 th Cir. 2006).
The district court's summary dismissal of Mr. Meister's post-conviction allegation that
defense counsel was deficient for failing to challenge the prosecutor's numerous instances of
misconduct was clear error and based on an unreasonable determination of the facts on record, and
therefore the district court's failure to hold a hearing on the claim requires reversal of summary
disposition. Matinez, 350 Idaho at 816-17; Gonzales, 120 Idaho at 763; see also, Nunes, 350 F.3d
at 1054; Hurles, 706 F.3d at 1038-40. However, on the present record, Mr. Meister has established
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that his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment Right to effective assistance of trial counsel has been
violated, and the Court should vacate his conviction.
C. The District Court Erred by Summarily Dismissing Mr. Meister's Post-Conviction Claim
of Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel for Introduction of Prejudicial Evidence against
Mr. Meister
Defense counsel twice introduced evidence against their client, Mr. Meister. First, defense
counsel precipitated the use of evidence that seemingly verified the content of Mr. Meister's
confession and then failed to rebut those facts with available evidence. (See generally postconviction claim 23 at R.Vol.18, pp.3820-24; R.Vol.18, pp.3693-95.) Second, defense counsel
introduced character evidence that Mr. Meister delighted in things associated with death and had
~

a perverted sense of humor. (See generally post-conviction claim 33 at R.Vol.19, pp.3949-50;
R.Vol.18, pp.3696-98.)
Mr. Meister confessed to conspiring with Jesse Linderman in the shooting death of Tonya
Hart. Mr. Meister's primary defense at trial was that the confession is false and was coerced by
interrogators. The circumstance of, and police influences on, the confession were subject to
extensive contest at trial. The controversy surrounding the confession persisted in large because
Mr. Meister was unable to provide in the confession any verifiable fact of consequence that would
prove conclusively that Meister had unique knowledge of the murder, and thus that the confession
were true. (R. Vols.13-14, pp.2850, 2880-81.)
However, one element of the confession story was verified, by all appearances to the jury:
Mr. Meister confessed to travelling to meet Mr. Linderman at Pizza Pipeline in downtown Moscow
to receive from Linderman his contact information by which they could communicate following

,...
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the murder that would take place later that night, December 11, 2001. During his August 29, 2002
interrogation, Mr. Meister confessed that police would find this contact information in his wallet,
which is exactly where a detective later found a pager number identified as Mr. Lindennan's. The
state utilized this fact during Mr. Meister's 2003 trial, arguing that it supported the case of murder
and conspiracy by uniquely corroborating the confession. (R.Vol.8, pp.1625-27.)
Sometime after Mr. Meister's 2003 conviction and sentencing, however, the
communications services company. Adelphia. provided the Latah County Prosecutor's Office with
documents showing that Mr. Linderman did have a pager service through the company, but that
the pager number found in Meister's wallet did not become active until February 4, 2002, two
months after the homicide. (R.Vol.18, pp.3924, 3967-68; R.Vol.20, pp.4218-24.) Naturally, then,
the State intended to abandon the pager evidence at Mr. Meister's 2011 retrial.
Nonetheless, the evidence was introduced at the 2011 trial. Defense counsel Thomas
Whitney raised the subject during his cross-examination of former LCSO Detective Kurtis Hall
about his search of Mr. Meister's wallet in early September 2002. (R.Vol.13, pp.2854-55 at Tr.,
p.1969, L.19 - p.1970, L. 7.) The cross prompted redirect by Deputy Prosecutor Michelle Evans,
in which the discovery of a "phone number" (it did not come out that the number was a "pager"
number) was emphasized and connected to Mr. Linderman. (R.Vol.14, p.2862 at Tr., p.1999, L.14
- p.2000, L.23.)
What was not introduced was the indisputable evidence that the pager number could not
have been given to Mr. Meister on December 11, 2001, because it did not exist until February
2002. The jury did not hear this, because neither the defense attorneys nor the prosecuting attorneys
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provided that evidence. The jury, therefore, deliberated under the false impression that Mr.
~

,..

Linderman's contact information was given to Mr. Meister on the day of the murder and in
furtherance of the alleged conspiracy, just as the confession described.
Counsel Whitney broached the subject ofDet. Hall's search of the wallet apparently for no
other season than to generally round-out Hall's testimony about his process of investigating Mr.
Meister. The circumstances of Det. Hall's search of Mr. Meister's wallet did not serve any of
Meister's trial defenses, nor did they impact the credibility of any witness. The fallout of Mr.
Whitney's cross on this topic, however, was the introduction of evidence that uniquely verified
Mr. Meister's confession to murder. The prejudice that this false impression had to Mr. Meister's
defense cannot be understated, and defense counsels' complicity in that presentation to the juryand then their failure to remedy it by using the Adelphia information - was unreasonable and
inexcusable.
Counsel Whitney, further, provided the jury character evidence that suggested Mr.
Meister's was the type of person who would commit murder for money.
Initially, defense counsel Scott Chapman moved in limine to exclude irrelevant and
prejudicial character evidence that State witness Duane Scott would give concerning Mr.
Meister's alleged propensity to tell "sick sex jokes" and to "laugh[] or tell jok[e] about people
killing people" or "things of that nature." The district court granted the motion to exclude.
(R.Vol.13, p.2795 at Tr., p.1731, L.9- p.1732, L.1.) Yet, despite Mr. Chapman's motion and the
district court's ruling, defense counsel Whitney brought the character evidence through hearsay
testimony of Det. Hall:
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[Whitney:] Okay. So, sir, having established that, I want you to read some lines from your
report, and I want you to follow along with me and make sure I read them correctly, okay?
So lets start with the part that refers to Duane Scott where it says, on March 17, 2003, okay,
sir?
[Hall:] Very well.
[Whitney:] I'm going to read that sentence. On March 17, 2003, I spoke by telephone with
Duane Scott, date of birth,
Did I read that right?
[Hall:] Yes, Sir.
[Whitney:] Okay. Now, skip down three paragraphs to where it says, Scott told me Meister
had ... Are we on the same spot?
[Hall:] There are two paragraphs that start that way, but I'm ready for either one.
[Whitney:] Oh, Meister told me - Scott told me Meister had a sick sense of humor.
[Hall:] Okay.
[Whitney:] Are we there?
[Hall:] Yes.
[Whitney:] All right. Scott told me Meister had a, quote, sick sense of humor, unquote, and
would talk and laugh about things that were gory, bloody or inappropriate to a
conversation. That's what your report says, doesn't it, Mr. Hall?
[Hall:] Correct.
(R.Vol.13, p.2822 at Tr., p.1838, L.15-p.1839, L.17.)
Mr. Whitney's introduction of Duane Scott's allegation that Mr. Meister possessed a
perverted sense of humor and delighted in death and gore served no defense strategy, nor pertained
to the credibility of either Hall, Scott, or Meister; and served no tactical purpose. Rather, the record
indicates that counsel Whitney used the prejudicial statement from Mr. Scott simply to orient Det.
Hall to a particular place in his report prior to questioning him about other matters that Scott
reported to Hall. (R.Vol.13, p.2822-23.) Counsel's conduct was objectively unreasonable. See~
Sager v. Maases, 907 F.Supp. 1412, 1419-20 (D.Oregon 1995) (defense counsel's introduction of
entire victim impact statement for use as a writing sample and for impeachment evidence found
unreasonable because of prejudice offered by the balance of the victim statement).
The district court's written opinion does not explain how it came to the conclusion that
counsel Whitney's introduction of Mr. Linderman's phone number evidence and Mr. Meister's
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bad-character evidence was reasonable. (R. Vol.21, pp.4467-69.) Whatever that rationale may have
been, the district court's result is incorrect. As outlined above, the record clearly shows that defense
counsel introduced evidence that had the appearance of verifying Mr. Meister's confession to
murder, and evidence that Meister was of the type of bad-character who would kill for money.
Introduction of that evidence was unreasonable and prejudicial. Strickland, supra. Additionally,
the district court's view that, even if trial counsel's performance was deficient, Mr. Meister failed
to show "that the outcome of the trial would have been different" if not for the error (R. Vol.21,
pp.4467, 4469) is based on an incorrect interpretation of the controlling standard of law. Rather,
Mr. Meister is burdened to show only "reasonable probability" that the outcome would have been
different - a less demanding standard than the outcome ''would have" been different. Lombright,
490 F.3d at 1121; Stanley~ 465 F.3d at 813.
Therefore, the district court's summary dismissal of Mr. Meister's post-conviction
allegation that defense counsel was Constitutionally deficient for introducing evidence against
their client was clear error and based on an unreasonable determination of the facts on record, and
therefore the district court's failure to hold a hearing on the claim requires reversal of summary
disposition. Martinez, 126 Idaho at 816-17; Gonzales, 120 Idaho at 763; see also, Nunes, 350 F.3d
at 1054; Hurles, 706 F.2d at 1038-40. However, on the present record, Mr. Meister has established
that his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to effective assistance of trial counsel has been
violated, and the Court should vacate his conviction.
D. The District Court Erred by Summarily Dismissing Mr. Meister's Post-Conviction Claim
that the District Court Erred by Limiting the Testimony of Dr. Richard Ofshe
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At trial, Mr. Meister attempted to present a defense that his confession was false and the
product of coercive interrogation tactics. Defense expert Dr. Richard Ofshe testified generally to
the types of false confessions and scenarios that can lead to them. (R.Vol.15, pp. 3118-23.)
However, Dr. Ofshe was not permitted to testify to the specific instance of police suggestiveness
that occurred during Meister's August 29, 2002 interrogation. (R.Vol.15, p.3134, 3137, at Tr.,
pp.3019, 3029-32.)
The preclusion of Dr. Ofshe's testimony on that critical subject constituted

error

because Dr. Ofshe's identification of specific instances of coercive interrogation tactics would
have been helpful to the average juror to identify and understand the nuanced police influences
that could have led Mr. Meister to give a false confession; and therefore, Dr. Ofshe's testimony
was admissible under Idaho Rule of Evidence 702. See~ State v. Almaraz, 2013 WL 1285940
at *14 (April I, 2013). And although Dr. Ofshe was able to give generalities about coercive
interrogations and false confessions, he was not allowed to deliver his punch line that he had
identified in Mr. Meister's interrogation several examples of police suggestiveness and other
influences of the type that have been determined to cause false confessions. The result of that
limitation undermined the balance and relevance of Dr. Ofshe's testimony and excised the heart
of Mr. Meister's defense that his confession was false and the product of coercion. The district
court, therefore, abused its discretion when limiting Dr. Ofshe's testimony, violating Mr. Meister's
Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment due process right to present a witness and defense to
challenge the weight, credibility, and voluntariness of the confession. Washington v. Texas, 388
U.S. 14, 18-19 (1967) (right to defense); U.S. v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 304, 315-18 (1998)

48

(discussing Constitutional right to present defense under Rock v. Arkansas, 438 U.S. 44 (1987),
Washington, supr~ and Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973)); see

~

Alcala v.

Woodford, 334 F.3d 862, 873-74 (9 th Cir. 2003) (trial court's preclusion of medial expert testimony
deprived defendant his Fourteenth Amendment right to present a defense, when the court excluded
testimony of Dr. Ray London who would have testified that the State's key witness adopted
investigators' suggestions while under hypnotic state).
Mr. Meister filed a direct appeal on the ground that the district court abused its discretion
by limiting Dr. Ofshe's testimony. The Idaho Court of Appeals, however, did not reach the merits
of the issue, but rather presumed error for a harmless-error analysis, and found the error harmless.
Mr. Meister then raised the issue on post-conviction, requesting the district court to address the
merits and re-evaluate the prejudice in view of the expanded collateral record. (See generally postconviction claim 44 at R.Vol.19, 3997-4003; R.Vol.18, pp.3751-54.) However, the district court
dismissed the claim at summary judgment, reasoning that "[i]ssues which have been previously
raised and considered on appeal will not be reconsidered at post-conviction." (R.Vol.21, p.4470.)
That conclusion, Mr. Meister now posits on appeal, was error and a violation of due
process. First, the Court of appeals did not reach the merits of whether the preclusion of Mr.
Meister's expert constituted trial error, and therefore the district court was not bound by the
doctrine of res judicata from considering the issue on collateral review. Second, the purpose of a
collateral post-conviction proceeding is to address the effect of trial errors in view of an enlarged
record that was not available at the direct appeal stage. Although the Idaho Court of Appeals found
that preclusion of Dr. Ofshe's testimony did not prejudice Mr. Meister, it made that determination
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on the limited record available on direct appeal. Subsequently, on post-conviction, in view of the
additional errors, and the enlarged record, Mr. Meister has a due-process entitlement to a reevaluation of the prejudice resulting from the limitation of Dr. Ofshe's testimony.
The district court's summary dismissal of Mr. Meister's post-conviction claim that
limitation of Dr. Ofshe's testimony prejudiced Meister's defense was clear error and based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts on record, and therefore the district court's failure to hold
a hearing on the claim requires a reversal of summary disposition. Martinez, 126 Idaho at 816-17;
Gonzales, 120 Idaho at 763; see also Nunes, 350 F.3d at 1054; Hurles, 706 F.3d at 1038-40.
However, on the present record, Mr. Meister has established that his Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth
Amendment right to present a defense has been violated, and his conviction should be vacated.
E. The District Court Erred by Summarily Dismissing Mr. Meister's Post-Conviction Claim
that the Jury was Exposed to Extrinsic Evidence Because the Jury Room was Insufficiently
Insulated from the Sound of Courtroom Proceedings
On post-conviction, Mr. Meister alleged that (a) his due process right to a fair trial was
violated because the jury was able to perceive extrinsic evidence and argument by counsel while
excused from the proceeding, because the jury room was not sufficiently insulated from sound
generated in the courtroom, and that (b) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object on this
ground. (See generally post-conviction claim 45(a), (b) at R.Vol.19, pp.4005-08; R.Vol.18,
pp.3755-59.)
A jury that perceived proceedings - throughout an entire four-week murder trial, in this
case - from which it had thoughtfully been excused by the court is an egregious violation of Mr.
Meister's right to a fair trial. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961) (The Sixth and Fourteenth
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Amendments guarantee the criminally accused a fair trial by an impartial jury); cf. State v. Hall,
111 Idaho 827 ( 1986).
On post-conviction, Mr. Meister argued at summary judgment that the ability of the jury
to overhear extraneous evidence and argument from counsel while excused to the jury room of
Courtroom Three of the Latah County Courthouse caused a presumptively prejudicial defect in
Mr. Meister's trial which created a structural error, requiring relief from the corrupted proceeding.
"Structural errors" are defects the fundamentally undermine the reliability and fairness of the trial,
and are not amenable to harmless-error review. 8 Arizona v. Fuliminate, 499 U.S. 279, 309-10
(1991). "Egregious" violation of due process right of fair trail can and has constituted structural
error, in this case requiring reversal without a reviewing court stopping to consider whether or not
there are particular instances of prejudice caused by the violation. see~ U.S. v. Alferahin, 433
F.3d 1148, 1159 (9 th Cir. 2006). 9
The district court did not analyze the legal basis of Mr. Meister's claim, but summarily
dismissed it on the ground that Meister had not provided sufficient evidence to establish a material
fact, and by adopting the State's argument that the issue could have been raised on direct appeal
and so was barred from post-conviction review. (R.Vol.21, p.4470; cf. R.Vol.17, pp.3577-78.)

8

Unauthorized communication, contact, or tampering with a jury during a criminal trial is
presumptively prejudicial. Remmer v. U.S., 347 U.S. 227, 229 (1954). The prosecution bears the
burden to show that non-de minimus unauthorized communication with the jury led to no
"reasonable possibility" that any extrinsic evidence influenced the jury's verdict. Caliendo v.
Warden of Cal. Men's Colony. 365 F.3d 691, 697 (9 th Cir. 2004).
9
However, the Court can satisfy itself that the trial records contains numerous non-de minimus
examples of extrinsic evidence reflected at Pages 4007 and 4008 of the Clerk's Record, Volume
19.
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The district court's conclusion was error; the district court had jurisdiction to hear the
claim. The egregious and shocking violation of the trial rights of Mr. Meister (and of every criminal
defendant who has been convicted by a jury in that courtroom) endowed the district court the
authority to hear the claim regardless of general procedural hurdles, in order to both vindicate
-

Meister's trial rights and prevent future harm to other defendants in that courtroom. Coleman v.
Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991) (collateral review of constitutional claim may overcome
procedural bar if failure to review the claim will "result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.").
Furthermore, sufficient evidence was provided to establish a material issue. Mr. Meister
supplied his own testimony regarding personal experiences of overheard courtroom proceedings
while waiting with counsel enclosed in the jury room of Courtroom Three. (R. Vol.18, pp.400506.) This evidence was not contradicted by the State, and was admissible under I.R.E. 402 and
602, being both relevant to the question of whether the jury room was sufficiently insulated from
adjacent courtroom proceedings, and is a matter within the personal knowledge of Mr. Meister. It
is also relevant to the question of whether defense counsel was ineffective for failing to attempt to
rectify the problem.
Mr. Meister's testimony, and additionally that of witness Lynn Aldridge, also show
(without dispute by the State) that on April 23 or 24, 2003, audio from the jury room could clearly
be heard in Courtroom Three, and is relevant to whether the jury room was itself protected from
the sounds of courtroom proceedings, is relevant to the question of whether counsel was ineffective
for failing to object, and were matters within the personal knowledge of Mr. Meister and Ms.
Aldridge. (R.Vol.19, 4005-06; cf. R.Vol.17, pp.3602-04.)
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The district court's rejection of this evidence under the rationale that the evidence does not
pertain to the 2011 retrial because the observations were made in 2003 (R.Vol.21, p.4470) is a
distinction based on the mistaken premise that the intervening eight years somehow negated the
2003 observations. This is incorrect because Mr. Meister's 2003 trial and 2011 retrial both took
place in Courtroom Three of the Latah County Courthouse, which is attached by the same jury
room. There is no evidence that in the interval of eight years the jury room was soundproofed.
To the contrary, evidence of Mr. Meister's personal experience, mentioned above, indicates
that the jury room remained unprotected from courtroom sounds in 2011. Further, there is evidence
on record that the district court, prosecutor, and defense counsel all were aware of the problem in
2011. Deputy Prosecutor Michelle Evans expressed in open court during trial that she feared the
excused jury could overhear a defense audio recording exhibit which was being played on proffer.
Ms. Evans asked that the sound be lowered. (R.Vol.14, p.2947-48 at Tr., p.2341, L.20 - p.2342,
L.5; R.Vol.19, pp.4005-06.) The transcript reflecting that event is admissible under I.R.E. 902,
903, and is relevant to show defense counsel's and court officers' knowledge of the problem and
to prove ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to attempt to remedy the fundamental defect
in the proceeding.
The district court's erroneous rejection of Mr. Meister's evidence, it should be noted, is
compounded by the district court's refusal to allow Mr. Meister's retained forensic expert to
investigate the jury room's construction, history, and lack of insulation from the sounds of
courtroom proceedings. The district court denied the request to investigate on the ground that, in
its opinion, it would be impossible to re-create the conditions of the 2011 trial. (R.Vol.19, pp.4006-
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7; R.Vol.21, p.4346.) However, the district court's opinion is unqualified in the matter and at odds
with the opinion of forensic expert Daniel Smith of DRS Investigation, who provided expert
testimony that it is very likely he would be able to determine whether a jury enclosed in the jury
room of Courtroom Three could overhear court proceedings. (R. Vol.21, pp.4345-46.)
The district court's conclusion that Mr. Meister "failed to submit any evidence in relation
to the most recent trial" (R.Vol.21, p.4470) is, therefore, clear error and an unreasonable
determination of the facts on record: Mr. Meister's factual allegations were neither incredible on
their face nor clearly refuted by the record, and the district court's failure to hold a hearing on the
claim requires reversal of summary disposition. Martinez, 126 Idaho at 816-17; Gonzales, 120
Idaho at 763; see also Nunes, 350 F.3d at 1054; Hurles, 706 F.3d at 1038-40. However, Mr. Meister
has established on the present record that his right to a fair trial (Irvin, supra) has been violated by
a structural defect (Arizon~ supra; cf. U.S. v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658 (1984)) which allowed
the jury to perceive extraneous evidence and argument from counsel, which deprived Mr. Meister
his Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment right to trial by an impartial jury. (Remmer, 347 U.S.
at 229).
Lastly, defense counsels' failure to object to the improper influence on the jury was
objectively unreasonable and prejudicial, depriving Mr. Meister his Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. See~' Cannon v. Nullin, 383 F.3d 1152,
1169-70 (10 th Cir. 2007). On these grounds, the court should vacate Mr. Meister's conviction.
F. The District Court Erred by Summarily Dismissing Mr. Meister's Post-Conviction Claim
that the Cumulative Error Deprived Meister a Fair Trial
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The effect of multiple individual errors - though each in and of itself harmless error - may
combine to deprive a defendant of his right to a fair trial under the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 298, 302-03 ( 1973 ); Parle v. Runnels, 505
~

F.3d 922,935 (9 th Cir. 2007); State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 215-17 (2010).
On post-conviction, Mr. Meister alleged that the cumulative effect of errors at trial denied
him the due process right to a fair trial and the right to effective assistance of counsel. (See
generally post-conviction claim 46 at R.Vol.19, pp.4010; R.Vol.18, pp.3761-3809.) The district
court summarily dismissed the claim of cumulative error, reasoning that Mr. Meister failed to show
that any errors occurred and therefore the doctrine of cumulative error did not apply. (R. Vol.21,
pp.4470-71.)
The district court's conclusion was clearly in error, being based on an unreasonable
interpretation of the facts. Contrary to the court's ruling, and as described above, Mr. Meister has
alleged and supported several claims that establish facts material to a determination of whether
cumulative trial errors and errors on the part of defense counsel denied Meister a fair trial.
Mr. Meister has demonstrated that defense counsel failed to present evidence that Meister's
confession was false. (R.Vol.17, pp.3716-34); failed to present evidence than an alternative
perpetrator committed the killing (R.Vol.17, pp.3739-40); failed to present evidence of Meister's
alibi (R.Vol.17, pp.3735-39); failed to oppose the prosecutor's repeated misconduct (R.Vol.17,
pp.3690-93, 3698-3716); introduced prejudicial evidence against Meister (R.Vol.17, pp.3693-98);
and failed to object to the introduction of extraneous evidence to the jury (R.Vol.18, pp.3755-59.)
The multiple instances of error, even if individually harmless error, combined together, and
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combined with the district court's erroneous limitation on defense expert Dr. Ofshe (R.Vol.18,
pp.3751-54), to deny Meister his right to a fair trial.
The post-conviction allegation and record support the finding of cumulative error, and were
not contradicted by evidence from the State, and were neither incredible on their face nor clearly
refuted by the record. Therefore, the district court's failure to hold a hearing on the claim is clear
error and based on an unreasonable determination of the facts, requiring reversal of summary
disposition. Martinez, 126 Idaho at 816-17; Gonzales, 120 Idaho at 763; see also Nunes, 350 F.3d
,.,.

at 1054; Hurles, 706 F.3d at 1038-40. However, on the present record, Mr. Meister has
demonstrated that his rights to a fair trial and effective assistance of counsel have been violated,
and the Court should vacate his conviction.
G. The District Court Erred by Summarily Dismissing Mr. Meister's Post-Conviction Claims
Without Allowing Opportunity for Discovery
The process of discovery is not conducted in post-conviction proceedings as freely as it is
in other civil actions, and is only done with authorization from the district court when discovery
materials are necessary to support a claim for post-conviction relief. Murphey v. State, 143 Idaho
139, 147-48 (Ct.App. 2006). Reasonable discovery may be permitted in the court's discretion.
Merrifeld v. Arave, 128 Idaho 306, 310 (Ct.App. 1996) However, the district court's denial of
discovery will constitute an abuse of discretion if the discovery materials sought are "necessary to
protect an applicant's substantial rights." Griffith v. State, 121 Idaho 371, 375 (Ct.App. 1992);
accord Murphy, at 147-48.
On February 12, 2006, Mr. Meister filed a Motion for Discovery, requesting that the district
court authorized the process of discovery and schedule accordingly. (R. Vol.21, pp.4345-48.) Mr.
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Meister's motion cited and incorporated Section IIl(A)(4)-(5), (8)(4)-(5), (C)(3)-(4), and (E)(3)(4) of the Response to State's Motion for Summary Disposition of the Amended Petition, which
sections identify the discovery material sought and discuss their necessity for Mr. Meister to
defend against the State's request for summary dismissal. (R. Vol.17-18, pp.3 664-68, 3682-84,
3741-50, 3759-60.) The district court denied the motion, stating that "The discovery requests made
are overly broad and nothing requested would lead to evidence which would protect a substantial
right of the Petitioner." (R.Vol.21. p.4471) Mr. Meister appealed (R.Vol.22, p.4653), and argues
that the district court abused its discretion by denying opportunity to engage in discovery.
The district court's two-fold conclusion that Mr. Meister's request for discovery was (1)
too broad and (2) not necessary to protect a substantial right is incorrect. With regard to Mr.
Meister's claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel as contemplated herein at Section
Argument (A)(2), discovery targeted at counsels' preparation for appeal and review of trial records
is relevant to a determination of whether counsels' performance on appeal was the product of
sufficient review of the case and professional judgment. (R. Vol.17, p.3667) Discovery target at
trial counsels' pre-trial and trial performance, as contemplated herein at Sections Argument (B)(E), was sought for substantially similar reasons. (R.Vol.17-18, pp.3683-84, 3744-45, 3760.) The
sworn testimony of appellate and trial counsel are necessary to substantiate facts material to Mr.
Meister's claims of ineffective assistance of both appellate and trial counsel, and are necessary to
protect Meister's substantial Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to effective assistance of
counsel.
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Mr. Meister also sought specific information material to whether trial counsel was
Gill

ineffective for failing to present available evidence that disputed the content of Mr. Meister's
confession. The sworn testimony of Troy Saggau, Ike Cantrell, Joe Rauch, and Arie Morgan
regarding their statements to police that Meister never said he would kill for money are relevant

~

to the material question of whether counsel were deficient for failing to contradict the confession
element that Meister announced to a group of co-workers at Pizza Pipeline that he would be willing
to kill for $1000. (See herein Argument (B)(2); cf. R.Vol.17, p.3742.)
The sworn testimony of Troy Saggau and Michael Garrison regarding their statements to
police about relationship issues between Ms. Hart and Mr. Linderman is relevant to the material
question to whether counsel were deficient for failing to show that Mr. Meister's confession to
knowledge of details about Ms. Hart and Mr. Linderman's relationship did not support the
prosecution's theory that Meister possessed particular knowledge about the relationship
(Argument (8)(2); cf. R.Vol.17, p.3942.)
The sworn testimony of Moscow Police Department officer with knowledge necessary to
interpret the contents, and assess the reliability, of the MPD Daily Officer Activity Report that
suggests MPD Sgt. Fager was at the MPD station at the time of the murder is relevant to the
question of whether counsel were deficient for failing to contradict Meister's confession that he

,_

saw a police cruiser on North Polk Extension immediately after 10: 15 p.m. shooting. (Argument
(8)(2); cf. R.Vol.17, p.3742.)
The sworn testimony of Gary Shultz, Sr. regarding his statements to police that he had
traversed his fields east of North Polk Extension and was ce11ain there were not discarded clothes
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there is relevant to the material question of whether counsel was deficient for failing to present
ta\

evidence that contradicted Meister's confession to discarding clothes in the fields east of North
Polk Extension. (Argument (8)(2); cf. R.Vol.17, p.3743.)
The sworn testimony of Adelphia representatives with knowledge of the content and
reliability of Adelphia records is relevant to the material question of whether counsel were
deficient for failing to present evidence that the Adelphia pager number found in Meister's wallet
came into service on February 4, 2002, and could not have been given to Meister by Linderman
on December 11, 2001, as Meister had confessed. (Argument (8)(2), (C); cf. R.Vol.17. p.3742)'°
The district court's denial of due process to discover evidence for the foundation and
admissibility of Adelphia records, as well as for the witness accounts that suggest Mr. Meister's
confession was untruthful on several crucial points, was therefore an abuse of discretion and
violation of Meister's Fourteenth Amendment due process right to utilize collateral state postconviction proceedings to vindicate his substantive Constitutional right to effective assistance of
counsel.

10

Although the Memorandum Opinion and Order on the State's Motion for Summary
Disposition and Petitioner's Motion for Discovery, page 11 (R. Vol.21, p.4467), indicates that the
district court accepted Meister's representation that the Adelphia records showed Mr.
Linderman's pager number was not active until February 2002, the district court's later ruling in
the Memorandum Opinion and Order on Petitioner's Motion for Judicial Notice and Motion for
Reconsideration indicates that the court considered at summary judgment the underlying
criminal record, of which the Adelphia records were not a part (R. Vol.22, pp.4645-46). Mr.
Meister now proceeds under the presumption that the district court excluded that Adelphia
records from its calculation upon summary disposition.
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In addition, the district court erred when it denied Mr. Meister the discovery opportunity
4=l

to obtain evidence from a witness to whom Lane Thomas gave an emotional confession to the
murder of Ms. Hart. The sworn testimony of Jeff Raschetz regarding his September 20 I I statement
to police that Mr. Thomas confessed to shooting Ms. Hart in the face over a drug dispute is relevant
to the material question of whether counsel were deficient for failing to present evidence that was
consistent and complemented Mr. Meister's alternative perpetrator defense. (Argument (8)(4); cf.
R.Vol.17, p.3744.)
Finally, the district court abused its discretion by obstructing Mr. Meister's informal
attempt to obtain proof that the jury room of Courthouse Three was not sufficiently insulated from
the sound of court proceedings (R.Vol.19, p.4006; R.Vol.21, pp.4345-46), and again abused its
discretion by denying Meister's later formal request for discovery opportunity to investigate the
same (R.Vol.18, pp.3759-60; R.Vol21, p.4471). The sworn testimony regarding the proposed
investigation of Courtroom Three and its jury room is relevant to the material question of whether
Meister's jury was exposed to extrinsic evidence and argument from counsel when excluded from

,.

the proceeding. Whether the jury was listening in on proceedings from which it had been excluded,
in tum, is relevant to the material question of whether counsel was deficient for failing to act to
remedy the problem, and to whether Meister was given a fair trial.
The discovery opportunity sought, therefore, was necessary to protect Mr. Meister's
substantial Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel and Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendment due process right to a fair trial by an impartial jury. The district court's failure to see
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that was clear error, and the Court should reverse summary di sposition and remand for fu11her
proceedings.
Conclusion

-

For the forego ing reasons, thi s Court shou ld vacate Mr. Meister" s conviction, or, in the
alternative, grant Mr. Meister a new direct appeal and reverse the district court's summary
dismissal of the application for post-conviction reli ef.
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